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ABSTRACT 
This study investigated the role of the Philippine armed forces intelligence 
community in the fight against terrorism within the Southern Philippines, the challenges 
it faced in recent years, and its role in not preventing and ending three major 
incidents: the Zamboanga Siege (2013), the Mamasapano Massacre (2015), and the 
Marawi Siege (2017). While the Mamasapano Massacre involved a failed 
offensive led by the Philippine National Police, the sieges were instigated by Islamist 
extremists. The theories of preventive action and patron-client relations help 
explain how and why the involvement of the intelligence community was not 
sufficient to predict the intent and capability of the Islamist terror groups. The 
intelligence community is constrained by the complexities of poorly implemented 
peace agreements in Mindanao, multiple highly complex threats, inconsistent 
diffusion and fusion of intelligence, limited resources, and competition. 
Recommendations to mitigate these issues and prevent future attacks focus on 
stakeholders with varying degrees of importance and influence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Several terrorist groups have plagued the Philippines for decades. There have been 
many instances when the legitimacy of the state has been challenged by these non-state 
actors. Previous major incidents like the 2013 Zamboanga Siege and the 2015 Mamasapano 
Massacre are just two examples of the efforts these threat groups undertook to project their 
power. These groups continue to thrive and survive in the southern part of the country; they 
easily blend in with the local population and maintain several training camps in remote 
areas. Just recently, the 2017 Marawi Siege was perpetrated by the more extreme of these 
radicalized groups, which aim to establish a province of the Islamic State (IS). This attack 
became a wake-up call for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to re-examine the 
strategy being employed to address the threats posed by multiple extremist Islamic groups. 
There is increasing pressure for the country, particularly the military, to better address the 
threat of terrorism.  
The AFP, as a protector of the people and the state, is challenged not only by these 
extremist Islamic groups, but by other threat groups as well, such as private armed groups 
(PAGs) and remnants of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), and communist New People’s Army. This context is highly 
complex and fluid. The armed forces intelligence community (IC) is responsible for 
providing assessments of and details about the threat groups that undermine the country’s 
national security. Terror incidents such as described above should have been pre-empted, 
given a responsive AFP intelligence community. To understand and explain the role of the 
armed forces’ intelligence organizations in fighting terrorism in the past decade, this thesis 
addressed four related questions: What is the role of the AFP intelligence community in 
the fight against terrorism within the Philippines? What challenges has the IC faced in 
recent years? How has it responded to these challenges? Why did it respond in those ways? 
In brief, the case studies that we reviewed suggested that the armed forces 
intelligence community plays a significant role in the fight against terrorism, because it 
2 
provides the information for decision makers to have the decision advantage and help 
eliminate uncertainties in the security environment. However, in getting this information, 
the IC is faced with the complexities of and ongoing problems associated with decades of 
peace agreements in Mindanao and other problems internal to the organization, such as 
limited resources and competition. While a lack of analysts might be a contributing factor, 
lack of funds and degraded equipment clearly contribute to the IC’s hampered ability to 
thwart major attacks. This speaks to a lack of state investment in the community as a whole. 
Furthermore, evidence from the three cases reviewed suggests that the monetary rewards 
given to the capture of high-value targets (HVTs) weighs more heavily than the overall 
potential impact of intelligence fusion on mission accomplishment. Finally, the patron-
client relations that exist in Mindanao negatively affected the gathering of intelligence on 
threat groups and the same patron-client relations negatively affect the institutions’ 
governance.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The threat of these Islamist terrorist groups has been a cause of concern for the 
Philippines for decades, harming development, good governance, and stabilization efforts 
in the restive south. It is imperative that a responsive PSF intelligence community (PSFIC) 
is in place to counter this threat. The Zamboanga Siege, the Mamasapano Massacre, and 
Marawi Siege suggest that something is not right in the AFP-PNP intelligence system, 
particularly the assessment of the intent and capability of these Islamist terrorist groups to 
stage another terroristic act. Perhaps a more responsive, integrated, and better coordinated 
PSFIC could provide more timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence that could help policy 
and decision makers act on the threats posed by these Islamist terrorist groups. A reformed 
PSFIC may be able to better support the AFP and the PNP in their missions to thwart future 
terror attacks perpetrated by these groups.  
To achieve this, it is necessary to understand limitations that exist within the PSFIC 
and the problems that the organization faces. That way, it could adapt to the security 
environment and perform its mission well in predicting how imminent a danger is and 
recommending ways to counter it. This would save lives, protect assets, and encourage 
3 
development and stability. Moreover, having a responsive, more effective IC in the 
Philippines could assure partners in the ASEAN region that the country can support joint 
initiatives in combatting terrorism. Furthermore, it would reassure the United States, in its 
global war on terrorism, that the Philippines, a longtime ally, continues to stand with 
the United States in its fight against terrorist groups and will provide valuable support in 
joint efforts.  
Analysis of the three cases confirms the validity of existing theoretical frameworks, 
such as the theory of preventive action and the theory of patron-client relations. The case 
study analysis using these theories paved the way for examining the problems that beset 
the country in a structured manner, using concepts and theories from the fields of 
intelligence studies and political science. It contributed new insights to the body of 
knowledge that would aid policy and decision makers and even scholars to confront and 
understand the threat of terrorism in the Philippines. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Three areas will be covered in this literature review: the intelligence system and 
counterterrorism in the Philippines, the three major terror incidents that will form this 
project’s case studies (Zamboanga Siege, Mamasapano Massacre, and Marawi Siege), and 
two theoretical frameworks, the theory of preventive action and theory of patron-client 
relations. Analyzing what we know thus far about these topics will allow me to critically 
organize and analyze data, answer questions, and recommend policies that this study 
attempts to address.  
1. Intelligence and Counterterrorism in the Philippines 
The purpose of intelligence is “to serve, inform, assist, and support policymakers 
and decision makers in their work, and to provide support to security and military 
operations and organizations.”1 States create intelligence organizations to ensure that they 
 
 
1 Cristiana Florina Matei and Carolyn Halladay, eds., The Conduct of Intelligence in Democracies: 
Processes, Practices, Cultures (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2019), 4. 
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have the capacity to confront security challenges in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and 
ambiguous environment, and ensure survivability of the state, regime, and governments.2 
Importantly, intelligence as a discipline is a key instrument for the survival of the state, 
regardless of regime type and administration.3  
a. Intelligence Operations in the Philippines 
A state’s survival depends on its ability to thwart the threats that challenge its 
legitimacy and control over borders and people. Highlighted in the AFP Campaign to 
Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) is the primacy of intelligence operations to support this 
endeavor.4 According to this document, intelligence work is one of the lines of effort in 
the whole-of-government strategy to be focused on to defeat the Dawla Islamiyah 
Waliyatul Masriq (DAESH)-inspired threat groups. Its purpose is to facilitate the 
neutralization of high-value individuals, the public and private personalities who are 
supporting the threat groups. Further, it provides intelligence support to counterintelligence 
for force protection and interagency coordination for the strict implementation of the anti-
money laundering law. While the role of intelligence was explicitly established in the AFP 
Campaign to CVE, one challenge of bringing the various arms of the IC to work together 
in neutralizing high-value individuals is its secretive and competitive culture, exacerbated 
by the enormous reward that is offered for target capture.  
The relationship of the AFP intelligence is through links from the policy and 
operational levels. At the policy level, each service branch has its own intelligence 
committees composed of intelligence units and offices.5 These committees serve as a body 
for coordinated actions in response to the requirements set by higher headquarters 
pertaining to intelligence and security. Within the AFP, the IC works on another committee 
 
 
2 Matei and Halladay, The Conduct of Intelligence in Democracies, 4. 
3 Matei and Halladay, 4. 
4 J3 Purisima, “Operational Directive 05-17: AFP Campaign to Counter Violent Extremism,” October 
24, 2017, 8. Armed Forces of the Philippines. 
5 Information on the links between policy and operations in the AFP intelligence community is based 
on the professional experience of this author.  
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called Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). Moreover, outside the AFP, another committee 
was set up called the Joint AFP-PNP Intelligence Committee (JAPIC) and the National 
Intelligence Board (NIB).6 Meanwhile, at the operational level, each branch of service has 
its own intelligence units who are responsible for providing intelligence and security 
services to support the mission peculiar to each service by geographical areas which could 
be provincial, regional and by unified command of the AFP. Within the AFP, they operate 
through the Joint Tactical Intelligence Coordinating Committee (JTICC-Provincial), Joint 
Command Intelligence Coordinating Committee (JCICC-Regional), and Area Military 
Intelligence Coordinating Committee (AMICC). Outside the AFP, Joint AFP-PNP 
Provincial Intelligence Committee (JAPPIC), Joint AFP-PNP Regional Intelligence 
Committee (JAPRIC), and Joint AFP-PNP Area Intelligence Committee (JAPAIC).7 
These committees provide the product of intelligence and counterintelligence operations 
in support to the requirements of national, strategic, operational and tactical end users.  
The primary sources of information for the PSF intelligence community were from 
the different intelligence disciplines available such as human intelligence (HUMINT), 
signal intelligence (SIGINT), technical intelligence (TECHINT), open source intelligence 
(OSINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT). These intelligence capabilities are embedded 
at the different branches of service, and their intelligence allocations are based on the 
threats they face in their areas of responsibilities.8 
Figure 1 illustrates how intelligence information is designed to be shared among 
military and national-police intelligence agencies in the Philippines. The solid lines 
indicate regular, systematic diffusion of information between intelligence operational units, 
which helps units verify the accuracy of intelligence; the regular feeding of verified data 
to the Unified Command Intelligence Office (UCIO) for fusion, sense-making, and policy 
recommendations; and the diffusion of UCIO-synthesized intelligence out to military and 
 
 
6 Philippine Navy N2, “Naval Intelligence Relationships with Other Intelligence Organizations at the 
Policy Level,” Slide 16. 
7 N2, Slide 16. 
8 AFP J2, “AFP Intelligence and Counterintelligence Program of Action CY 2019,” March 2, 2019. 
6 
PNP intelligence leaders in command headquarters for policy decisions and field action. 
The dotted lines directly between the intelligence operational units and intelligence leaders 
in command headquarters indicate regular, informal diffusion of information that bypasses 
the UCIO. Informal diffusion is necessary for immediate dissemination of intelligence and 
happens under conditions of imminent threats. In practice, the systematic diffusion and 
fusion of information tends to be irregular and imperfect.  
 
Figure 1. Fusion and Diffusion of Information in the Philippine 
Security Forces Intelligence Community9 
b. Scholars’ View on Counterterrorism in the Philippines 
Scholars generally view counterterrorism in the Philippines as gaining ground. 
However, the support coming from major countries like the United States and Australia 
may not be enough to sustain the fight because of its global scale. The necessity of a having 
a more comprehensive approach must be considered because the threat continues to evolve 
and poses a challenge to the country. 
In “The Philippine Response to Terrorism,” Alexander Aguirre describes the 
Philippines’ holistic strategy of defeating terrorism by directly engaging the agents of 
 
 
9 Diffusion and fusion model developed by this author and Sandra Leavitt in their discussions about 
how the ideal sharing of intelligence would operate in the PSF intelligence community.  
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terrorism.10 He writes, “the tactical countermeasures and intelligence operations carried 
out by the police and the military led to the neutralization of key terrorist personalities.”11 
This, he argues, has given the people a sense of peace and protection. However, he 
indicated that the strategy would soon be constrained because of limited resources and the 
need to address the root causes of the problem.12 Confirming his view, after his article was 
published in 2011, the three major terror incidents that this study considers—Zamboanga 
Siege (2013), Mamasapano Massacre (2015) and Marawi Seige (2017)—took place. This 
validates the need to look into the bigger picture of addressing the threat of terrorism and 
the tools and strategies being used to counter it.  
In “The Philippines’ Continued Success Against Extremists,” Peter Chalk outlines 
the domestic security environment in the country by describing the three major terrorist 
groups: the Abu Sayyaf Group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and the New People’s 
Army.13 He then discusses the effectiveness of the Philippines’ counterterrorism efforts 
with assistance coming from the United States and Australia. Overall, he concludes that 
the threat posed by the three groups was manageable. Chalk, however, may have seen the 
enormous amount of money, effort, and time the United States and Australia have exerted 
in the fight against terrorism, yet such investments have failed to deter the terrorist groups 
from continuing their struggle. As a matter of fact, the groups continue to thrive and 
survive. They continue to pose a significant threat to the national security of the country.  
In “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Forces 
Assistance,” Stephen Biddle et al. tout the effectiveness of United States Security Forces 
Assistance (SFA) in counterterrorism in the Philippines, which is focused on training, 
equipping, and advising the elite special forces of the AFP to confront the terrorism threats 
 
 
10 Alexander P. Aguirre, “The Philippine Response to Terrorism,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and 
Counter Terrorism 4, no. 1 (April 2009): 62, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335300.2009.9686923. 
11 Aguirre, “The Philippine Response to Terrorism,” 62. 
12 Aguirre, 62. 
13 Peter Chalk, “The Philippines’ Continued Success Against Extremists,” Combating Terrorism 
Center at West Point, August 15, 2009, 4, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-philippines-continued-success-against-
extremists/. 
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that beset the country.14 U.S. assistance yielded several successes, especially in 
neutralizing some of the Abu Sayyaf Group’s leaders operating on the islands of Basilan 
and Jolo.15 However, the U.S. SFA should also consider supporting the AFP intelligence 
community in enhancing their capacity to find, track, and neutralize high-value individuals. 
The Philippine IC’s support coming from U.S. SFA were on a need basis but not extensive 
as the elite special forces. The elite special forces’ ability to neutralize targets cannot be 
fully realized without the target packet that the IC provides. Indeed, intelligence and 
counterterrorism in the Philippines have been widely supported by great powers like the 
United States and Australia. The challenge is up to the Philippine security forces to 
translate this support into tangible results that could ensure the minimization, if not 
elimination of, the threats posed.  
2. The Zamboanga Siege, the Mamasapano Massacre, and the Marawi 
Siege 
The threat of terrorism as illustrated by these three major terror incidents—the 
Zamboanga Siege, the Mamasapano Massacre and the Marawi Siege—is a clear and 
present danger. This phenomenon continues to challenge the country’s legitimacy and 
ability to govern.16 In doing so, the capability of the security forces is tested, which has 
resulted in displaced innocent people, halted development, and continued instability, which 
wreaks havoc in the country.17 The impact of this threat creates uncertainty in the security 
environment, not only within the domestic sphere but also in the region.  
In researching the Zamboanga Siege, Linda Robinson et al. examine why the 
Philippine security forces did not gain absolute success in the operations. They argue that 
 
 
14 Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker, “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military 
Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1–2 (February 23, 2018): 
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16 Daniel Joseph Ringuet, “The Continuation of Civil Unrest and Poverty in Mindanao,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 24, no. 1 (2002): 34. 
17 Ringuet, “The Continuation of Civil Unrest and Poverty in Mindanao,” 34. 
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the Philippine intelligence community lacked prior knowledge of the intent of the MNLF, 
and that there was a lack of coordination between the AFP and Philippine National Police, 
which prolonged the operations.18 This resulted in almost 120,000 people being displaced 
and hundreds of people being killed, both from the rebel and government side, as well as 
civilians caught in the crossfire.19 My study will emphasize these two factors: intelligence 
and coordination. I believe these two elements in counterterrorism play a vital role in a 
successful counterterrorism strategy.  
In studying the Mamasapano Massacre, Nathan Quimpo describes the 
counterterrorist operation targeting two of Southeast Asia’s most wanted: Malaysian 
explosive expert, Zulkifli Bin Hir, alias Marwan; and Filipino bomb maker, Ahmad Akmad 
Batabol Usman.20 The two had been on the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) list of most-wanted persons with a staggering $5 million offer for information leading 
to the capture of Marwan and $1 million for Usman.21 As Quimpo revealed, the operation 
was conducted by the elite Special Action Force (SAF) of the Philippine National Police 
(PNP), specially trained and advised by the U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force- 
Philippines (JSOTF-P) to fight transnational terrorism. The tragic result was the death of 
44 SAF troopers, 17 MILF fighters, five civilians, and possibly one or two Americans.22 
As Quimpo noted, the incident created disastrous consequences for the government’s peace 
development efforts in Mindanao and triggered an anti-MILF stance from a majority of 
Christian-Filipinos. However, the MILF claimed that an “intelligence failure” on the part 
of the government to assess their presence in the area resulted in such unfortunate loss of 
life from both government and MILF sides.23 This indicates that a successful 
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19 Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014, 98. 
20 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “Mindanao: Nationalism, Jihadism and Frustrated Peace,” Journal of Asian 
Security and International Affairs 3, no. 1 (April 2016): 74, https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797015626046. 
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counterterrorism operation should provide advice and training to both intelligence and the 
elite special operations units.  
In examining the Marawi Siege, Jasminder Singh concludes that there are five 
factors that led to the crisis: culmination of the jihadi struggle in the country since the 1960s 
to the present, major failure on the part of the IC to detect the plan by pro-ISIS to capture 
Marawi City, failure of counterterrorism agencies to anticipate that something significant 
would happen following the defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the 
Middle East to somehow attempt to divert attention elsewhere, failure of the AFP and 
intelligence units to anticipate the conglomeration of Filipino and foreign fighters in 
Marawi before the attack was staged, and the success of the jihadists to divert and split the 
AFP and PNP in its deployment.24 Of these five factors, three were claimed to be the failure 
of Philippine security forces, particularly the IC, to assess the threat posed by the jihadists. 
This failure of the AFP and PNP to come up with credible intelligence suggests that a gap 
exists in the intelligence system that is a cause for concern. Indeed, from the three major 
terror incidents, scholars pointed repeatedly to the inability of the AFP intelligence 
community to assess the intent and capability of the different terrorist groups.  
3. Theoretical Frameworks 
Two theories that this thesis uses are the theory of preventive action and the theory 
of patron-client relations. These theories helped me understand the role played by and 
challenges faced by the PSF intelligence community in the fight against terrorism.  
In Intelligence and Surprise Attack, Erik Dahl presents the theory of preventive 
action.25 He explains that to prevent a surprise terrorist attack, a combination of precise 
intelligence and policymakers’ receptivity must be present. In his study of the U.S. 
intelligence community’s exploits, these two factors make intelligence a success or a 
failure as measured by the thwarting and deterrence of attacks. Precise tactical-level 
 
 
24 Jasminder Singh, “The 2017 Marawi Attacks: Implications for Regional Security,” n.d., 40–41. 
25 Erik J. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and 
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warning, the first factor in preventive action, is critically important even in major terrorist 
attacks such as 9/11. He argues that the more specific and tactical the warning the more 
likely that decision makers are receptive and will act on that intelligence.  
The theory of preventive action has been used by several scholars in their attempts 
to understand problems ranging from the rise of ISIS, terrorism warnings in the United 
States, and the problem of mass murder. In “How Intelligence Failures Contributed to ISIS 
Territorial Gain in Iraq,” Brian Simpskin described how the U.S. intelligence community 
failed to produce precise tactical-level intelligence after its withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, 
upon which policymakers became unreceptive to strategic warnings that then contributed 
to the rise of ISIS.26 In Silent Warning: Understanding the National Terrorism Advisory 
System, Roy Brush discussed decision makers’ difficulty in achieving the “decision 
advantage” in the use of terrorism warning systems at the strategic level since they lack the 
receptivity element of the theory of preventive action.27 At this level, decision makers are 
less likely to act on strategic warnings that do not gain their trust and confidence that 
warrant their decision and action. In another study, Pre-empting Mass Murder: Improving 
Law Enforcement Risk Assessment of Persons with Mental Illness, John Milby applied the 
theory of preventive action in analyzing the cases of mass murders. He found that failure 
to appreciate the two elements of the theory would lead to catastrophic consequences. In 
the above studies, scholars validate the two elements that Dahl presented in his theory. 
Milby argues that the presence of precise intelligence and policymakers’ receptivity is a 
must in preventing terror attacks.  
The theory of patron-client relations is described as the reciprocal, dyadic 
relationship of the patron, a person of power, influence, and status, who helps or protects a 
client who, in return, provides loyalty, political allegiance, and other services to the 
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patron.28 This model remains one of the most influential in the study of Philippine politics 
because it aptly explains significant dynamics in the democratization process of the 
country.29  
In Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of 
Surveillance State, Alfred W. McCoy described the transformation of the colonial police 
that the United States established during its pacification of the Philippines in the early 
1900s.30 McCoy argues convincingly that Filipino elite families have been able to use the 
power of the police to continually serve their agenda and perpetuate their position at the 
helm of Philippine politics. This legacy has posed a great challenge to the intelligence 
apparatus of the AFP because of the patron-client relations that have been embedded in 
Philippine society since at least colonialism under the Spanish and the United States. 
D. EXPLANATIONS AND TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESES 
An effective armed forces IC would provide timely, accurate, and relevant 
intelligence to policy and decision makers to act on matters that need informed judgement 
and actions taken. Terrorist groups can undertake their attacks, in part, because of gaps or 
lapses in the process of pre-emptively gathering, providing, and acting on intelligence. 
Three significant factors may explain these gaps or lapses.  
First, it is necessary to describe the intelligence operations, in particular the roles, 
culture, mandates, policies, procedures, and communication of intelligence agencies. 
Surmising that some of these elements may be hampering the practice of a good 
intelligence system necessary in the fight against terrorism, I hypothesize that the nature of 
intelligence contributes to a clear direction for the intelligence units in counterterrorism 
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but that the institutions are negatively affected by patron-client relations. The analysis of 
the case studies supports this hypothesis because it shows that the ability of the IC to gather 
information was hindered by patron-client relations and the debated accuracy of 
intelligence did not merit the attention of decision makers.  
Second, I hypothesize that while the force-provider and force-employer concept in 
the AFP is intended to encourage information sharing and integration of intelligence 
professionals, in practice the different AFP service branches—Army, Navy, and Air 
Force—as force providers and the Unified Commands—Northern Luzon Command 
(NOLCOM), Western Command (WESCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), Eastern 
Mindanao Command (EASTMINCOM), Western Mindanao Command 
(WESTMINCOM)—as force employers prevent fusion of information. In my experience, 
the different special intelligence units, like the Army Intelligence Regiment of the Army, 
the Naval Intelligence Support Force of the Navy, and the 300th Air Intelligence Wing of 
the Air Force, rarely share information. This is exacerbated by the fact that the terror-group 
leaders are of high value and units want monetary and status rewards for themselves and 
their patrons as well as their clients. The U.S. government provides a large amount of 
monetary compensation for neutralization or capture of these leaders. The Unified 
Command Intelligence Office (UCIO), which should fuse and integrate the different 
intelligence coming from these units, is thus not properly informed and, at worst, is not 
aware of this intelligence from within its area of responsibility. Thus, the intent and 
capability of these terrorist groups was not properly assessed because of the absence of 
other significant parts of the information. The analysis of the case studies supported the 
hypothesis that the lack of sharing of information was due, in part, to competition that 
exists in the IC. 
Third, I hypothesize that there are not enough professionally trained intelligence 
researchers and analysts in the different intelligence offices of the armed forces of the 
Philippines. Because the country is under complex threat conditions—the longest-running 
communist insurgency in the world, the Muslim secessionist movements, terrorism, 
widespread illegal drug problems, organized crime groups, territorial disputes with 
neighboring countries, and so on—the number of intelligence professionals staffing the 
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offices may be insufficient given the many threats the country faces. Furthermore, the 
knowledge, skills, and attitude of these intelligence professionals appears inadequate. The 
schools that provide intelligence training for personnel who would like to pursue this 
specialized field lack necessary support for the conduct of the training.31 The career 
progression of intelligence personnel in the different branches of service is not properly 
established.32 Patron-client relations may be facilitating job placement and promotion 
without the requisite skills in these individuals. Testing this hypothesis on the number and 
quality of analysts and researchers in the Philippine armed forces IC faced limitations due 
to lack of data availability. However, after review of the cases, another resource constraint 
came out, namely lack of funds and equipment.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis applies the case-study analysis approach to understand and explain the 
role of intelligence in the fight against terrorism, describing the existing intelligence 
structure of the armed forces of the Philippines and exploring whether the intelligence 
system structures and patron-client relations discourage fusion and integration of 
information. Furthermore, it analyzes the existing intelligence cultures and looks at what 
values, beliefs, and norms may prevent agencies from cooperating. It examines three major 
terrorist attacks in the past seven years—the Zamboanga Siege, the Mamasapano Massacre, 
and the Marawi Siege—to identify gaps and issues in the intelligence operations which 
may be a response to challenges that would undermine the armed forces of the Philippines 
mission as a protector of the people and the state.  
This thesis describes the major actors participating in a conflict, the nature of the 
challenge to the Philippine security forces to maintain the peace effort in Mindanao, the 
response to how the country’s intelligence apparatus failed to prevent the above incidents, 
the outcome of the three cases being studied, and implications in the fight against terrorism. 
 
 
31 The author was the squadron commander of the Air Force Intelligence Training School mandated to 
train PAF personnel (officers and enlisted personnel) in intelligence and counterintelligence. 
32 Author’s viewing of multiple texts and personal communication with aids to key leaders., n.d. 
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The analysis uses the theories of preventive action and patron-client relations to understand 
the three successful terrorist attacks and what these mean in terms of the larger threat of 
terrorism. Recommendations made in this thesis are designed to help policy and decision 
makers adopt a more comprehensive approach to prevent similar crises from being 
perpetrated by radicalized Islamist terror groups and may have lessons applicable to 
fighting other groups that violently challenge state power, development, and democracy.  
F. THESIS OUTLINE AND UPCOMING CHAPTERS  
The second, third, and fourth chapters correspond to the three cases studies, the 
Zamboanga Siege, the Mamasapano Massacre, and the Marawi Siege, respectively. Each 
describes the case in greater detail, identifies the case’s major actors, explains the nature 
of the security challenge, and provides a threat assessment using the intent, capability, and 
opportunity framework as applied to the terrorists. The fifth chapter analyzes the case 
studies using the theories of preventive action and patron-client relations. Finally, the last 
chapter contains the conclusion, discusses implications to intelligence operations, and 




















II. ZAMBOANGA SIEGE 
This chapter examines the events that led to the infamous Zamboanga Siege 
perpetrated from September 9–29, 2013, by elements of the Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF), including problems within the Philippine IC that hampered efforts to 
prevent and then end the siege. In this event, a faction of the MNLF, supported by locally-
based private armed groups, invaded some coastal communities in Zamboanga City after 
they were prevented by Philippine Security Forces (PSF) from entering the city proper 
purposely to hoist their flag and declare independence from the state.33 The firefight lasted 
for 21 days; hundreds of lives were lost, hundred thousands of lives were displaced, and a 
great number of properties were destroyed and such serious damage to Zamboanga’s 
vibrant economy resulted that the United Nations declared it a “humanitarian crisis.”34 
Even as late as June 2019, over 1,000 internally displaced people continued to live in camps 
as a result of the siege, while over 2,000 more continued to shelter with family and 
friends.35 The siege finally ended when the Crisis Management Committee declared that 
it was over because the RMEs were neutralized and all hostages rescued.36 
This chapter begins by describing the primary and secondary actors involved in the 
siege and its resolution. Then follows a description of the nature of the challenge to the 
Philippine security forces to maintain the peace effort in Mindanao, in general, and 
Zamboanga City, in particular. The chapter finally describes how the country’s security 
intelligence apparatus was unable to prevent the siege and how it responded to the threat 




33 Aquilino Pimentel Jr., “Philippine Senate Resolution Nr 393 Directing the Appropriate Senate 
Committee(s) to Conduct an Inquiry on the Motives behind the Zamboanga Siege” (16th Congress of the 
Republic of the Philippines, November 27, 2013). 
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35 “Zamboanga City—Five Years after the Siege—Philippines,” ReliefWeb, accessed May 29, 2020, 
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36 “JSOG After Battle Report - OPN AYUDA_final.Pdf,” n.d., 12. 
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A. MAIN ACTORS 
Six major actors and many secondary actors were involved in the Zamboanga 
Siege. Two types of non-state groups executed the siege, while four governmental 
organizations formed the core that worked to prevent and end it. The primary group 
conducting the siege was a faction of around 200 armed men of the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF), also known as Rogue MNLF Elements Misuari Group (RME-
MG). Ustadz Habier Malik, the “righthand man” of former MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari, 
led this faction.37 The RME-MG was supported by several private armed groups (PAGs) 
that were also operating in the Zamboanga Peninsula area from Ener Misuari groups 
(Zamboanga Sibugay), Ismael Dasta group (Basilan), and Usong Uggong Group (Lamitan 
City).38 Combined, the RME-MG and PAG forces totaled 700 armed men.39 
The other major actors, who countered the siege, came from the Philippine security 
forces, namely the army, navy, air force, and Philippine National Police. In conjunction 
with Contingency Plan Lantaka of the Western Mindanao Command of the AFP, the Joint 
Task Force of Zamboanga Peninsula and Lanao (JTF ZamPeLan) organized the Joint 
Special Operations Task Force-Vector (JSOTF-V) to be the main effort during the 
Zamboanga crisis.40 The JSOTF-V was composed of units under the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines Joint Special Operations Group (AFPJSOG) and the Philippine National Police 
Task Force Zamboanga.41 AFPJSOG’s primary task was “to conduct special military 
operations to counter terrorist activity throughout the Philippines.”42 It had operational 
control of components from the Army’s Light Reaction Company, the Navy’s Naval 
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Special Operations Unit, the Air force’s 710th Special Operations Wing, the Marines’ 
Marine Special Operations Company, and its own personnel, the Joint Special Operations 
Unit 1, 2, and 3.43 The commander of AFPJSOG during the Zamboanga siege was Army 
Colonel Danilo G. Pamonag who led the units to engage the RMEs.44 
Once the siege began, other organizations became involved. On the side of those 
supporting the siege were the other factions of MNLF. They mainly supported the RME-
MG with manpower and firearms. On the side of the state, several organizations 
collaborated closely with the primary players, the military and National Police. These 
included the Office of the President of the Philippines, with the President playing the role 
of policy and strategy decision maker.45 Moreover, Zamboanga City Mayor Beng 
Climaco-Salazar led the crisis management committee. As the crisis dragged on, other 
government agencies like the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 
Office of Vice President Jejomar Binay, and some members of Congress participated in 
the negotiations.46 
B. NATURE OF THE CHALLENGE
This section describes the primary challenge as a failure of the state and rebel
factions to uphold promises made in the MNLF-GPH peace accords, which aggravated the 
security situation in Mindanao, and the poor state of affairs in the Philippine IC, which was 
unable to predict and prevent the siege. Politics and lack of progress over 37 years in 
implementing previous agreements with the MNLF played an important role in the 
motivation behind the siege. More proximate to the siege, the government’s interactions 
with two still-powerful insurgency groups, the MNLF and the MILF, helped provoke the 
situation. In particular, the state failed to reach out to the MNLF Misuari faction to assure 
43 “Armed Forces of the Philippines Joint Special Operations Group (AFP-JSOG).” 
44 “JSOG After Battle Report - OPN AYUDA_final,” 28. 
45 “Zambo Crisis: The Fog of War,” Rappler, accessed April 21, 2020, 
http://www.rappler.com/nation/40640-zamboanga-crisis-war. 
46 “Zambo Crisis.” 
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them that the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the GPH and the 
MNLF would not be jeopardized with the state’s ongoing peace talks with MILF.47  
1. MNLF-GPH Peace Accords: Nearly Four Decades of False Starts 
The Moro secessionist movement traces its origin to 1969 when the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) was formed by Nur Misuari and other Moro-Muslim 
dissidents.48 This group’s overall goal was a total liberation of the “Bangsamoro” from the 
Philippines. Bangsamoro is a term coined from the Malay word Bangsa and Spanish word 
Moro describing a nation of ethnic Muslims living primarily in Mindanao and hailing from 
thirteen ethnic groups (Maguindanaoan, Maranao, Tausug, Samal, Badjao, Yakan, Iranun, 
Sangil, Molbog, Jama Mapun, Palawanon, Kalagan, and Kalibugan).49 Their primary 
grievances were economic and political marginalization, confiscation of ancestral lands by 
Philippine Christians resettling from the northern provinces of the Philippines, and human 
rights abuses carried out by the state and vigilante groups supported by the state.50 They 
continued their armed struggle up until an initial agreement was reached between the 
MNLF and GPH in 1976, known as the Tripoli Agreement, with President Ferdinand 
Marcos.51 This agreement was brokered by Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi who 
introduced the concept of an autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao.52 
In 1977, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was formed as an offshoot of 
the MNLF due to ideological differences and a belief that the MNLF was not holding true 
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to the organization’s goals.53 The MILF wanted independence for the Moro people instead 
of autonomy as the MNLF espoused. Hostilities between the state and MILF began around 
1984, partially as a result of the breakdown of the Tripoli Agreement. After the Marcos 
regime was overthrown by a popular revolt in 1986, which was supported by many Moro-
Muslims, President Corazon Aquino resumed peace talks with the MNLF which resulted 
in the enactment of RA 6734, the Organic Act of Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM) and promised further discussion on the proposed autonomy of the whole of 
Mindanao.54 This second agreement is known as the Jeddah Accord of 1987.  
In 1996, the administration of President Fidel V. Ramos, a former constabulary 
general, and the MNLF entered into yet another agreement. It was dubbed “the final peace 
agreement” (FPA) since previous agreements with the MNLF—the Tripoli agreement 
(1976) by President Ferdinand Marcos and the Jeddah Accord (1987) by President Corazon 
Aquino—failed to deliver the promise of a peaceful Mindanao that offered security, human 
rights, economic development, and political participation for the vast majority of Moro 
Muslims in Mindanao.55 The FPA established the mechanisms to bring about the full 
implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, including autonomy.56 However, some 
MILF rebels, angered by how the ARMM had been implemented and governed since its 
inauguration in 1990, sought total independence from the Philippines and rejected the 
FPA.57 According to MILF leader Hashim Salamat, that FPA deviated from the framework 
of the original Tripoli Agreement.58 In spite of this, the Ramos administration succeeded 
in negotiating the General Cessation of Hostilities Agreement with the MILF in 1997.59 
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The election of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada in 1998 generated a 180-degree 
turn from his predecessors. Instead of continuing the peace accords, his administration 
adopted a different approach with the MILF, initiating an “All Out War” with the 
secessionists rebels until he was ousted in 2001.60 This strategy prompted the MILF to 
declare jihad or holy war against the Philippine government.61 Then President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo reinitiated the peace talks with MILF upon her assumption of office, 
which produced an incremental success but not total peace.62 Then, in 2012, after the 20th 
round of talks since the formation of MILF and multiple administrations, President 
Benigno Aquino renegotiated with the MILF; however, this time he negotiated with the 
Framework Agreement of the Bangsamoro (FAB), which would replace the Autonomous 
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with a new political entity.63 He claimed that “the 
ARMM was a failed experiment because the system alienated the people thus they continue 
to articulate their grievances using the barrel of a gun.”64 During this period, the MNLF-
GPH 1996 peace agreement was about to put closure on the Tripartite review process 
facilitated by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) chaired by Indonesia.65 The 
result of the tripartite review process would ensure that the government fulfills its 
remaining commitments to the MNLF.66 However, this was misinterpreted by the 
followers of Misuari as a closure of the GPH-MNLF Final Peace Agreement.  
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The Philippines’ National Security Policy 2011–2016 recognized the MNLF to be 
a continuing threat group because of it causing occasional problems despite the 1996 peace 
agreement.67 This intermittent problem intensified when Zamboanga City was under siege 
from September 9–28 by a faction of MNLF members loyal to Nur Misuari. Misuari, 
former chairman of the MNLF, felt he was left out by the ongoing peace negotiations 
between the government and the MILF.68 His became the most dominant secessionist 
group in Mindanao and, despite attempts to work within government structures such as the 
ARMM, members continued their armed struggle across six Philippine administrations 
(Presidents Ferdinand Marcos, Corazon Aquino, Fidel V. Ramos, Joseph Estrada, Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo, and Benigno Aquino Jr.).69 Misuari, still powerful and angered by the 
new agreement being developed between the MILF and state, declared independence 
through the Rogue MNLF Elements (RME-MG) Misuari Group, led by Malik, his 
deputy.70 Like the MILF before him, Misuari, claimed that the Philippine government had 
not fulfilled its commitment to MNLF-GPH peace agreement.71 
2. Complex Security Situation in Mindanao 
The complexity of the security situation in Mindanao posed an ongoing challenge 
to the PSF, particularly the IC, making it difficult to uncover the MNLF’s plans, intentions, 
and courses of actions. The emergence and complex, inter-relationships of different non-
state groups—particularly the MNLF, MILF, factions of the MNLF and MILF, Abu Sayyaf 
Group, BIFF, and PAGs—contributed to this challenge. With members of these groups 
holding multiple loyalties to other groups, as well as loyalties based on clan and geography, 
establishing trustworthy contacts was highly risky and difficult. These groups monopolized 
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violence in their controlled areas, which were quite vast outside of major cities. This 
created areas where there was very little state-based security and thus only marginal 
penetration by the IC. Moreover, the goals that these groups pursued were so diverse that 
the government had difficulty finding the optimal strategy to address their multiple 
concerns. 
In addition, the PSF struggled to gather intelligence because these groups had high 
security awareness. To infiltrate or penetrate an organization, the intelligence professional 
has to evaluate the access and placement of a possible recruit.72 Access and placement 
criteria are essential factors in evaluating whether one qualifies to be an excellent action 
agent. However, the members of the different threat groups knew that they were under 
surveillance. This awareness came from some of their members who had links with local 
terrorist groups and international terror networks, as well as ties to state-based security 
organizations, if not their own then through family members or friends. In addition, the 
MNLF, MILF, and Abu Sayyaf Group (founded in 1992), in particular, had developed 
structures and systems that allowed them to survive for decades.73 The high-level security 
practices of multiple rebel groups made the process of gathering information on them 
require a lot of time, work, and resources. 
3. Intelligence Community’s State of Affairs: Lack of Resources and 
Competitiveness 
The Philippine IC struggles with lack of resources given the many threats present 
at one time and competitiveness within its ranks. The community lacks both human and 
technological sources of information on adversaries. Because intelligence agencies cannot 
trust open sources for accurate information, they must also have other sources to validate 
any publicly available information. One source that could validate the relevance and 
accuracy of information is human intelligence (HUMINT). This is considered by many 
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scholars and practitioners to be the most viable option for authorities to exploit when a 
certain group, in this case the MNLF, practices high levels of security awareness.74 
HUMINT is especially important when other sources that the intel community relies 
upon—such as Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), and 
Technical Intelligence (TECHINT)—are unavailable.  
Resourcing and maintaining these assets is an ongoing challenge in the Philippines. 
HUMINT, by its nature, takes time, resources, and networks to succeed. The technological 
capabilities are limited and sometimes degraded. In addition, already scarce resources can 
be pulled away from operators, such as when some sections of the IC are asked to focus on 
more urgent threats and when the wide array of threats contributes to the dispersal of these 
specialized capabilities.  
Leading up to the Zamboanga Siege, the IC failed to recruit an insider or human 
asset inside the MNLF. Nor did it have adequate other means to gather information. Based 
on my own experience operating as an intelligence officer in Mindanao, the organization 
has meager resources to recruit and maintain human assets and limited intelligence 
equipment. Given competing priorities, there are not enough analysts who can focus on the 
threat of the MNLF.75 In 2013, factions of the MILF, Abu Sayyaf Group, and the newly 
formed BIFF seemed to be higher priorities. 
In addition to resource constraints, intelligence agencies tend to compete against 
each other rather than cooperate. One issue is that the U.S. and Philippine governments’ 
high bounties offered for the capture of high-value terrorist members spur this competition. 
For instance, Zhulkifli Bin Hir/Zulkifli Abhir, also known as Marwan, is a known 
international terrorist responsible for several terror attacks in Indonesia (mastermind of the 
Bali bombings in 2002), Malaysia (killing of Christian members of parliament in 2000), 
and several bombings in the Philippines. He has an outstanding reward from the Philippines 
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amounting to Php 7.4 million ($150,000) and another $5.0 million from the U.S. State 
Department.76 Intelligence operatives as well as their informants were thus motivated to 
competitiveness and secrecy because each branch of intelligence wanted to reap the reward.  
It seems as if the rationalist view of personnel—for monetary and reputational 
gain—weighs heavier than the overall potential impact of fusion of information in 
accomplishing the IC’s mission. This view contributes to more competition instead of 
creating an environment of cooperation. In the case of the Zamboanga Siege, in my 
assessment, the high-value and high-visibility monetary rewards being offered at the time 
prevented the sharing and fusion of information, producing a gap in PSF’s intelligence 
operations.77  
C. PROBLEMS WITH INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS  
The Zamboanga Siege perpetrated by RME-MG came about when the warnings of 
an impending attack in Zamboanga City were not properly processed by the IC. The 
information gathered prior to the siege can be analyzed through the intelligence perspective 
in terms of timeliness, accuracy, completeness, and relevance of information for the 
purposes of serving, informing, assisting, and supporting decision makers in their work and 
for providing support to security or military operations.78 Data can be further analyzed by 
the target’s intent, capability, and opportunity. In this case, the purpose of intelligence had 
not been fulfilled given the complexity of the challenge and the state of affairs in the IC, 
especially lack of resources.  
Intelligence failed to uncover timely, precise, and tactical information that the 
preventive action theory deems necessary for effective action. Analysis of information 
through different sources is a challenge for intelligence professionals, especially if the 
information does not meet the criteria of relevance and completeness. To come up with 
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these elements, an intelligence analyst should integrate all sources of information, which 
often requires sharing of information across organizations or between individuals. 
Moreover, analysts look for data to be confirmed by multiple source types, such as 
HUMINT and SIGINT. 
In October 2012, prior to the Zamboanga Siege, open sources revealed that Nur 
Misuari rejected the Framework Agreement of the Bangsamoro (FAB) as proposed by the 
Aquino government to the MILF.79 He asserted that “the term of the agreement was 
unacceptable” and accordingly that it was a formula for renewed hostilities in Mindanao.80 
He claimed that about 17,000 MILF had defected in favor of MNLF, and that another 
group, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), could join the MNLF to spoil 
the peace process.81 Misuari’s warning posed a concern to former military rebel and now 
senator, Gregorio Honasan, who urged Misuari to give the framework agreement a 
chance.82 On the other hand, these warnings were downplayed by peace negotiators both 
from the government and the MILF.83 Although the warnings were made and were timely, 
intelligence analysts were unable to evaluate the accuracy and completeness of the open-
source information because they had no other sources to validate it and its seriousness.  
Only after the capture of MNLF fighters during the Zamboanga Siege did army 
intelligence discover that Musuari had a plan and a task force in place to execute it. The 
MNLF’s operation, drafted by Misuari and called Hudaybiyyah, drew its name from a 
model of politics wherein original Muslim lands were colonized by non-Muslims and must 
be retaken. This operation was the preparatory campaign plan to advance the MNLF’s 
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quest for self-determination and independence. Accordingly, on July 21, 2013, Misuari 
called an emergency meeting with his staff including the general staff to iron-out “Task 
Force Kamahaldikaan” (a Tausug word for independence or freedom). This task force as 
Misuari planned would designate Habier Malik as the overall commander by the time they 
would declare the Independent Bangsamoro Republik in Zamboanga City.84 This valuable 
information, if gathered in accordance with timeliness, accuracy, and relevance, could have 
helped analysts properly evaluate the plans, intentions, and courses of actions of the 
MNLF. Finally, this could have spelled a difference to the appreciation of decision makers 
as to what actions were needed to prevent the Zamboanga Siege. Yet, as the data below 
show, open sources provided sufficient warnings between October 2012 and the September 
2013 Zamboanga Siege which were not acted upon.  
1. Assessment of the Threat  
The AFP intelligence community’s involvement prior to the siege was insufficient 
to predict the intent, capability and opportunity of RME-MG to stage the attack. These 
three elements of analyzing the threat are tools used to come up with a threat assessment 
for subsequent informed decisions of policy and decision makers.  
The intent of RME-MG to project their relevance as a stakeholder to the peace 
accord in Mindanao was not uncovered by the intelligence apparatus of the PSF in the area 
despite its close proximity to Zamboanga; the Western Mindanao Command 
(WESMINCOM), the Naval Forces Wesmin, and the Police Regional Office 9 (PRO 9) 
are all stationed in Zamboanga City. The movements of RME-MG just a few days before 
the siege from September 6–9, 2013 were not discovered by intelligence units. 
Accordingly, RMEs started their movement from Sulu to Basilan then to Zamboanga City, 
while others moved from Zamboanga Sibugay to Zamboanga Del Sur then to Zamboanga 
City prior to the siege.85 
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Although routine police and military operations tracked RME movements, it was 
too late to prevent the siege. It was reported that the day before the start of the hostilities 
five rogue MNLF commanders were arrested by personnel of PNP mobile group. 
Moreover, the Navy Special Operations Unit, while conducting a maritime interdiction 
operation, encountered approximately a hundred rogue MNLF members onboard their 
boats sailing towards Zamboanga city.86 This tactical and precise intelligence was not 
timely enough to prevent the different RME-MG elements from occupying their positions 
prior to the attack.  
The foregoing indicates that the IC was not able to provide a good threat assessment 
because the intent and capability of the MNLF were not properly analyzed. As revealed in 
the interview of some Philippine officials and U.S. Special Operations unit (JSOTF-P) 
stationed in Zamboanga city, the attack and the subsequent hostage-taking surprised 
them.87  
D. CONCLUSION 
After identifying the main actors, the nature of the challenge and reviewing the 
intelligence available before the Zamboanga siege using the threat assessment of intent, 
capability and opportunity framework, the result of the study in this chapter yielded that 
there were enough warnings to merit action from decision makers. However, the decision 
makers were unconvinced of the intelligence that they were receiving because primarily 
intel units were not united in treating MNLF as a threat group. This was exacerbated by 
the fact that the organization had internal problems brought about by the rationalist view 
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III. MAMASAPANO MASSACRE 
This chapter examines the events that led to the infamous Mamasapano Massacre 
in Maguindanao, Mindanao, which occurred on January 25, 2015, wherein 67 Filipinos 
died in a bloodbath when a government-led raid went awry. Of those, 44 were members of 
the Philippine National Police Special Action Force (PNP-SAF), 18 were members of the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)/Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and 
five were local residents, shot either in crossfire or by the SAF in retaliation.88 This 
massacre was triggered by Operational Plan (OPLAN) Exodus which was designed to 
neutralize known international terrorists Zhulkifli Bin Hir/Zulkifli Abhir aka Marwan, 
Ahmad Akmad Batabol Usman aka Usman, and Amin Baco aka Jihad.89 This law 
enforcement operation, which was supported by the military US-Philippines joint special 
forces command, did not go as planned; while the primary target, international terrorist 
Marwan, was killed, the Muslim community around the area engaged in a firefight with 
the withdrawing SAF Commandos, resulting in the massacre. The second target, another 
international terrorist named Usman, escaped.90  
This chapter begins by describing the primary and secondary actors involved in the 
siege and its resolution. Then follows a description of the nature of the challenge to the 
Philippine security forces to maintain the peace effort in Mindanao, in general, and 
Mamasapano, in particular. Finally, the chapter describes how the country’s security 
intelligence apparatus was unable to prevent the siege and how it responded to the threat 
as it evolved. 
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A. MAIN ACTORS
There were two major actors in the Mamasapano Massacre: the PNP-SAF, which
executed OPLAN Exodus, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) supported by 
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and Private Armed Groups (PAGs) who 
controlled the area where the high value international terrorists reside.  
The PNP-SAF is an elite unit of the Philippine National Police primarily formed 
“to serve as a rapid deployment force for situations with national and international 
implications such as hostage rescue, commando type unconventional warfare, search and 
rescue in times of calamities and disasters, civil disturbance management during national 
emergencies, and other special operations.”91 One of its mandates is to conduct counter 
terrorism operations against local and international terrorist groups.92 
On the other hand, the MILF is one of the Muslim secessionist movements in the 
country. It splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1978 over 
leadership and strategic conflicts.93 Its founder Hashim Salamat rallied radical members 
of MNLF and formed MILF.94 It has become the largest and most organized because of 
its leadership component and military arm, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces 
(BIAF).95 Its main goal is to establish an independent Islamic state in Mindanao.96 The 
MILF has engaged in several peace pacts with the government and negotiations continue. 
Further, the BIFF is another splinter group, this time from MILF, who disagreed with the 
MILF leadership on the terms of the agreement with the negotiations to the government.97 
The group wanted full independence rather than an autonomy. Its founder, Ameril Umbra 
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Kato, commanded the 105th Base Command of the MILF, who declared his group “BIFF,” 
a “lost command” to signal its breaking away from MILF.98 Furthermore, PAGs refers to 
“an organized group or two or more persons, with legally or illegally possessed firearms, 
utilized for purposes of sowing fear and intimidation, and violence for the advancement 
and protection of vested political and economic interests.”99 These private armies 
encouraged the promotion of the gun culture, low level of human security, rido or clan war, 
political dynasties, and the use of military and police auxiliaries.100 
B. NATURE OF THE CHALLENGE
1. MILF-GPH Peace Negotiations and Conflict
The peace negotiations and violent conflict between the government of the 
Philippines and the MILF had been on and off for decades, setting the stage for battlefront 
errors such as the Mamasapano Massacre. Since the Marcos Era, each new administration 
had a fresh mandate from the people to end hostilities in Mindanao, even as each differed 
in approach. When the MILF became the strongest rebel group in the restive south, the talk 
of peace agreement came to the fore again although there are some quarters in the 
government that are wary of negotiations. The government’s first agreement with the MILF 
was the 1997 General Cessation of Hostilities, designed to oversee that both parties refrain 
from committing and provoking prohibited acts. However, with the change in 
administration in 1998, an all-out war strategy was adopted by President Estrada instead of 
a negotiated peace pact. With the government not honoring the agreements made by the 
previous administration, the “All Out War” succeeded in the capture of major MILF camps 
in Central Mindanao but almost a million people were displaced because of this shift in 
policy.101 
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With the administration of President Arroyo taking office in 2001, talks with MILF 
were again launched. In this period, the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) was created, 
purposely to isolate the many criminal, syndicated, kidnap-for-ransom groups, including 
the “lost commands” operating in MILF-controlled areas.102 Also, the Arroyo 
administration and MILF signed the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain 
(MOA-AD) in 2008, which the Supreme Court later ruled to be unconstitutional, thus 
setting back years of efforts.103Another round of hostilities began between the government 
forces and MILF after the Supreme Court’s decision, until a new administration again came 
into power in 2010.  
President Aquino and MILF Chairman Al Haj Murad were committed to resume 
the peace negotiations with the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro 
(FAB) in 2012. The framework was designed to lay the groundwork for negotiations, but 
follow-on law was required before it could be implemented. The Comprehensive 
Agreement of the Bangsamoro (CAB) followed, also having been signed by representatives 
of the GPH and the MILF in March 2014, proposing the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL).104 
The BBL would lay the framework for the creation and administration of an autonomous 
Bangsamoro homeland, carved out of areas in Mindanao and surrounding waters.105 The 
objective of the BBL is to fulfill the longings of the Moro-Muslims in Mindanao for self-
determination, maintaining their ethno-religious identity, and economic development.106 
This peace agreement between the government and the MILF would be put to a severe test 
on January 25, 2015 with the Mamasapano Massacre.  
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2. Threat of International Terrorists 
After resumption of peace talks between the government of President Aquino and 
MILF in 2011, no recorded hostilities arose between the government forces and the MILF 
until 2015. This relatively peaceful environment ended when the elite PNP SAF launched 
a law enforcement operation to serve the arrest warrants of two high-value international 
terrorists, Marwan and Usman.107 Marwan had an outstanding warrant of arrest by the U.S. 
and Philippine governments for his responsibility in several terror attacks in Indonesia, 
including masterminding the Bali bombings in 2002; Malaysia, where he organized the 
killing of a Christian member of parliament in 2000, the burning of 140 homes in Saparua 
Central Maluku, and the attack of Christian community in Tanah Goyang West Ceram;108 
and directly participated in ten bombings in the Philippines, particularly in Mindanao from 
April 2002 to July 2013, killing 46 and wounding 207.109 Usman’s outstanding warrant 
was for his role in the April 2002 General Santos City bombing that killed 15 and injured 
55.110 Their capture offered a Php 7.4 million ($150,000) and $5 million U.S. from the 
U.S. State Department, since both terrorists had links with international and local terror 
groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and BIFF.111  
The duo had been a target of many failed attempts by military forces and the police. 
In 2003, the presence of Marwan was monitored in Mindanao. The first operation to 
capture Marwan, OPLAN Pitas, was in December 2010 in Parang Sulu by the PNP SAF. 
Another operation, OPLAN Smartbomb, against Marwan also by PNP SAF in Butig Lanao 
Del Sur, was conducted in July 2012. In December 2012, OPLAN Wolverine was crafted 
but aborted. In April 2013, OPLAN Cyclops was launched in Marawi City and executed, 
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but the HVTs managed to escape. A follow-up operation OPLAN Cyclops 2, scheduled for 
June 2013 was aborted. In April 2014, OPLAN Wolverine 2 was launched against Marwan 
and Usman in Brgy Libutan Mamasapano, Maguindanao, by PNP SAF in coordination 
with AFPJSOG and the 6th Infantry Division (6ID). However, this OPLAN was aborted 
because 6ID could not deploy its mechanized infantry. Another operation, on May 30, 
2014, OPLAN Wolverine 3, carried out by the PNP SAF and 6ID, was again aborted. On 
June 10, 2014, 6ID launched its own operation but the duo managed to escape. On 
November 29, 2014 OPLAN Terminator was launched but this mission was aborted due 
to equipment failure. Then in December 2014, OPLAN Terminator 2 was again aborted 
because the PNP-SAF encountered rebels at the vicinity of the target. These earlier 
neutralization operations were not successful for several reasons, usually because the 
targets managed to escape, or the missions were aborted before they began.112  
Hence, OPLAN Exodus was conceptualized by PNP-SAF through SAF Director 
Napenas and his staff. The presentation of the concept of operation was then arranged by 
PNP Chief Purisima to President Aquino. To avoid another failure, the PNP-SAF initiated 
a secretive, unilateral approach to capture both targets (Marwan and Usman), cooperating 
only with a small unit in the PNP-SAF, top police leadership, and the president himself. 
They suspected that other security forces (local PNP and AFP) in the area in one way or 
another had collaborated with the international terrorists, making every operation against 
them unsuccessful.113 The security force’s advanced notification system was not deployed 
as required by custom because Napenas and Purisima believed that, as much as possible, 
the mission should be kept secret until the PNP SAF was engaged. This was the tenth 
attempt to capture Marwan by the security forces.114  
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3. Intelligence Community’s State of Affairs 
The IC’s poor state of affairs was characterized by a lack of resources, distrust 
between government units, and intense competitiveness between branches and individuals. 
These characteristics significantly affected law enforcement operations conducted by the 
SAF Commandos to neutralize the HVTs in Mamasapano, Maguindanao Province. The 
massacre displayed the inability of the IC to support major law enforcement operations and 
the PNP’s inability to work in close partnership with the IC. 
a. Lack of Resources 
The massacre displayed the inability of the IC to support major law enforcement 
operations. A lack of resources in terms of acquiring reliable, real-time information prior 
to and during the massacre was a challenge to the IC operating in the area.  
Admittedly, my personal experience as intelligence officer can attest to this 
problem. Prior to the incident, the unit that I led was in the process of recruiting a HUMINT 
asset to penetrate the areas where the HVTs hid. It had been the practice of my unit to first 
personally invest our own money in the development of an intelligence project before it 
could be considered and approved for official funding. The resources used during the initial 
stage of intelligence project development are then refunded after an intelligence operative 
has been financed.115 This arrangement delays HUMINT recruitments and curtails the start 
of others. This had been the customary practice; because of a lack of resources and limited 
funds, only successful efforts are refunded. The need to “prove” a project before it is 
funded, and eligible for refund, is a must. Therefore, if personal funds are scarce, this 
important development work would not be done.  
This lack of resources in terms of having real-time awareness was evident during 
the January 2015 Mamasapano PNP-SAF operation and mitigated, in part, by the U.S. 
government.116 PSF intelligence community lacks the capability of giving real-time 
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information while the SAF operation was ongoing that U.S. intelligence counterparts 
provides. According to the SAF Director, the U.S. Special Forces provided reliable 
information about Marwan and Usman.117 He admitted that the technical intelligence 
support provided by the United States helped them to formulate and execute the OPLAN 
Exodus.118 Quality intelligence gives decision makers a decisive advantage, making a big 
difference in the results of the operations. Unfortunately, the real-time information 
available was not translated to the advantage of the government forces, because decision 
makers did not act accordingly, to the detriment of SAF commandos.119 
b. Competitiveness
Investigative journalist Maria Ressa wrote in April 2020 about intense competition 
among the PSF authorities, in particular, describing the rivalry between the Philippine 
military and the police. This competitiveness resulted in numerous foiled operations prior 
to OPLAN Exodus.120 That is why intelligence about the operation was kept on a need-to-
know basis.121 Interestingly, she relates this competition to two U.S. security 
institutions―the Central Intelligence Agency working with the U.S. Special Forces and 
the FBI working with law enforcement.122 Interagency competition is then intensified 
when coupled with rivalries among local and national politicians who favor their own 
vested interests.123 
Unknown to other intelligence agencies, different special intelligence units of the 
security forces had their own efforts to eliminate or capture the international terrorists. 
They had recruited their own human assets to gather information on the whereabouts of 
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both targets. Indeed, I had launched my own intelligence project for the same subjects. 
OPLAN Firebird, which I authored, was in its operational testing phase of the human asset 
that my unit recruited at the time the Mamasapano Massacre happened.124 Based on my 
personal knowledge, the Philippine Army, Intelligence Security Group, had their own 
human assets, meaning they also had information about the HVTs in the area.125 A member 
of the PNP-SAF assault team 84th Seaborne, Police Senior Inspector Recaredo Marasigan, 
also had been discretely working on these HVTs.126 I remember him calling me on the last 
week of November 2014 and asking for the Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) of the area prior 
to the Mamasapano operations. I then directed him to the proper office where he could 
obtain such information. His inquiry was timely because, at the time, the 306th Air 
Reconnaissance Squadron had just updated the IMINT of that area. I believe the IMINT 
that he obtained served him well because, against great odds, he survived the massacre.  
4. Increasing Pressure on the SAF as an Elite Unit  
The PNP Special Action Force (SAF) is an elite unit mandated to conduct 
counterterrorism operations against local and international terrorist groups. As mentioned 
in the Senate Committee Report, PNP-SAF was considered by some to be the primary unit 
that could take out the HVTs.127 As the HVTs enjoyed relative freedom of movement 
inside the SPMS (Salibo, Pagatin, Mamasapano, and Shariff Aguak) Box, the risks grew 
that a bombing operation would be successfully executed by these terrorists. As time went 
on and previous attempts since 2010 by the PNP to eliminate these targets had failed, the 
pressure was increasing on SAF, because the unit was specifically tasked with a 
responsibility to act.128  
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In particular, pressure mounted from chief of police by President Aquino. This 
pressure compelled the SAF to move forward when, in six of the past nine attempts to 
eliminate these targets, operations had been aborted due to various reasons.  
5. SAF Misinformation and Lack of Coordination and Ceasefire 
Mechanisms  
Another challenge for successfully executing the mission was the presence of 
multiple, interrelated rebel and violent groups in the targets’ area of operation, which 
confused and heightened the risks of intelligence gathering and confusion leading to 
mistakes. Several mechanisms had been installed to help ensure that operations could be 
conducted as agreed, such as the MILF agreeing to temporarily move out of an area so that 
the military could extricate a target or asset.129 Yet, these agreements were not used by the 
SAF before the Mamasapano Massacre. With SAF commandos believing that they would 
be used but with their leadership not doing so, the SAF may have moved forward with too 
much confidence. 
The dual HVTs were in the vicinity of the controlled area of several armed groups 
whose members were connected and interrelated with each other through kinship, 
intermarriage, and religious beliefs (certain sects of Islam).130 Mamasapano is located in 
the northwest corner of the SPMS Box in Maguindanao. The target area, called the SPMS 
Box, is a square considered for decades to be a stronghold of the MILF and BIFF.131 SAF 
was well aware of the possibility of engaging the 105th and 118th Base Commands of the 
MILF, BIFF, and PAGs during the execution of the OPLAN Exodus but believed they were 
more likely to encounter BIFF and PAGs than the MILF.132 Because of the ongoing peace 
talks between the government and MILF, there was an assurance that SAF would conduct 
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pre-event coordination with the MILF.133 This was part of the briefings that were presented 
to SAF Commandos prior to the law enforcement operations, so that they would be 
confident that if anything went wrong help would come to their rescue.134  
Ceasefire mechanisms also were considered but not activated during the SAF 
planning process to mitigate any untoward incidents that might happen. First, the 
Coordinating Committee on Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) was tasked “to oversee that 
both parties shall desist from committing any prohibited hostile and provocative acts.”135 
As revealed in Senate testimony, the CCCH is composed of representatives from MILF 
and the government designed “to immediately respond to de-escalate any reported 
confrontation from opposing forces.”136 Second, the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (GPH-
AHJAG) was mandated “to coordinate, monitor, and disseminate information between and 
among the AFP and PNP for the government, and between and among the BIAF for MILF, 
to affect apprehension and arrest of the identified criminal elements within the MILF-
controlled areas and communities.”137 Finally, an International Monitoring Team (IMT) 
composed of representatives from Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Norway, and Japan were 
to observe, monitor, and verify any violations on the ceasefire agreement between the 
government and MILF.138  
However, instead of activating these ceasefire risk-mitigation mechanisms prior to 
operation launch, OPLAN Exodus was planned using time-on-target (TOT) coordination 
with the AFP and ceasefire mechanisms (CCCH, GPH-AHJAG, and IMT). TOT 
coordination restricts disclosure of information until the target is engaged, considering first 
the operational security of the mission. This was done to avoid the same mistakes that 
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previous operations encountered wherein the targets escaped after being tipped off.139 Yet, 
given that prior warning and coordination had become expected, the surprise attack 
backfired, leaving the SAF without the MILF to back them up and, indeed, with the SAF 
and MILF fighting each other.  
C. PROBLEMS WITH INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
As discussed in Chapter II, decision makers and operators need intelligence that is 
timely, accurate, complete, and relevant. Intelligence or foreknowledge that meet these 
criteria is especially critical for decision makers to act on matters that demand their 
immediate action, such as imminent threats or during operations. However, this 
intelligence cannot be easily obtained or verified without getting into the processes of 
validation, such as integration and fusion. Fusion and sharing of information were 
apparently not practiced to any meaningful degree prior to, during, or after the 
Mamasapano Massacre. As such, the intelligence units responsible for the process of 
collaboration were unaware of the upcoming operation in their areas of responsibility, and 
thus those operating on the ground faced an unexpected, confusing situation. 
1. Lack of Fusion and Sharing 
Intelligence fusion and sharing was not evident prior to the Mamasapano Massacre. 
The PSF intelligence units were not in proper coordination as to how to manage the threat 
groups in their areas of responsibility. For instance, the PNP SAF Director, Napenas, 
claimed that he started working on the neutralization of Marwan as far back as December 
2010, when he was still the Deputy Director of SAF, and that he participated in two 
OPLANs, in July 2012 and May 2014.140 He averred that the PNP Police Regional Office- 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (PRO-ARMM) had continuously provided the 
intelligence packet for the neutralization of the said HVTs, which was but one source and 
not shared with other intelligence groups. In the same manner, the AFP, through the 6th 
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Infantry Division (6ID), Philippine Army conducted its own operation without 
coordination with PNP, and also failed.141 The separate missions conducted by the PNP 
and AFP suggest that they did not collaborate to manage these particular threats in their 
shared areas of responsibility.  
During the operation and massacre, it was revealed that the AFP intelligence units 
were unaware of the OPLAN Exodus. For instance, the Unified Command Staff for 
Intelligence, U2, learned about the SAF Mamasapano operations on the day the OPLAN 
Exodus was launched. The U2 is the unit that is tasked “to supervise, direct, and coordinate 
all intelligence and counter-intelligence operations in the area of operations of Western 
Mindanao Command (WESMINCOM).”142 Although the unit admitted that as early as 
September 2014, HVT Marwan was a subject of intelligence operation, the mission was 
aborted due to disagreement on the manner of taking down the subject if it would be 
coordinated with the CCCH.143 Further, the staff intelligence officer (G2) of the 6ID 
believed that their office had all the relevant information in the area of Mamasapano and 
disclosed that their sources monitored the movements of MILF, BIFF, and PAGs early in 
the morning of the SAF operations to reinforce their comrades.144 This information was 
also not shared, because the G2 also did not know about the PNP-SAF’s operation. 
Furthermore, the intelligence officer of 45th Infantry Battalion, tasked to oversee combat 
operations and administrative functions, only learned about the SAF operations when one 
of his informers reported sporadic gunfire in their area early in the day of the operations.145 
After the massacre, the Unified Command Intelligence Unit (U2 WESMINCOM) 
called a meeting for a Joint Intelligence Coordinating Conference, comprised of all the 
intelligence units in the area, to fuse any information regarding the incident, especially 
 
 
141 “Mamasapano_NBI-NPS_SIT_Report_REDACTED,” 42. 
142 “Mamasapano_NBI-NPS_SIT_Report_REDACTED,” 139. 
143 “Mamasapano_NBI-NPS_SIT_Report_REDACTED,” 139. 
144 “Mamasapano_NBI-NPS_SIT_Report_REDACTED,” 142. 
145 “Mamasapano_NBI-NPS_SIT_Report_REDACTED,” 140. 
44 
information on how the other targets were able to escape.146 Such lessons learned are 
crucial for continuing operations and avoiding similar failures. Nonetheless, units and 
agencies were hesitant to share information.147 This suggests that the intel units are 
competing with each other, rather than collaborating and sharing information. 
2. Assessment of the Threat  
The intent, capability, and opportunity framework of studying the threat groups in 
the area was not properly analyzed. As described by the Senate investigation on the 
Mamasapano massacre, “the PNP SAF’s intelligence preparation of the battlefield was 
grossly inadequate.”148 This description indicates that the PNP was unable to come up 
with a credible threat assessment before executing the OPLAN Exodus.  
Intelligence analysts did not properly evaluate the intent of the different threat 
groups (MILF, BIFF, and PAGs) inside the SPMS Box wherein the HVTs took refuge. 
This provided uncertainty on the assessment of the probability of inflicting harm to SAF 
commandos. However, scanning the environment of which the Muslim society in 
Mindanao revolves could help analysts better predict the threat groups’ intent. For instance, 
taking into account the age-old tradition of pintakasi, prevalent in the Moro-Muslim 
communities, could help make better predictions. Pintakasi is “a conglomeration of just 
about any armed malefactor, immaterial of group affiliation and united by religion, blood 
ties, and the singular goal of annihilating a common enemy usually an outsider or 
intruder.”149 Moro communities are well-known for practicing pintakasi, which existed 
for a long time wherein they helped each other for the benefit of all the members of their 
communities.150 This is what happened on the day the members of SAF Commandos 
entered the Mamasapano community. The MILF, BIFF, and PAGs were compelled to 
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initiate a pintakasi with the intent to kill and eliminate their perceived threat, the SAF 
commandos.151 
Despite the information that around 1,000 hostile troops were in the area, the SAF 
planners of OPLAN Exodus failed to consider this factor of capability.152 The G2 6ID, Lt. 
Colonel Danilo Benavidez, admitted that from their assessment, MILF, BIFF, and PAGs 
in the SPMS Box considered all the PSF to be their common enemy.153 He was confident 
with this claim because of the intelligence they had built up through their network of 
informants in the area. As a result, they developed a very comprehensive game plan when 
they led the Mamasapano rescue operation.154 Further, it was also revealed that the SAF 
was unable to consider the mortar cannon capability of the threat groups. This was only 
learned when the lone survivor at the main battle area described his ordeal.155 He revealed 
that massive firepower came from all over the place. Further, had the SAF planners known 
the mortar cannon capability, they should have made the necessary preparations, and the 
outcome could have been different, according to the SAF trooper.156 
Lastly, the opportunity aspect of the threat assessment on the massacre was 
exploited by the different threat groups. A sworn affidavit from the Mamasapano 
investigation conducted by government authorities revealed that a number of SAF 
commandos tried to surrender after an hour of firefighting with the MILF, BIFF, and PAGs 
but were finished off.157The threat groups definitely saw this as an opportunity to avenge 
the death of Marwan. Further, these groups also seized the opportunity to strip the dead 
SAF commandos of anything of value, such as uniforms, bulletproof vests, boots, and 
especially guns and ammunition. These valuables then were their prizes for participating 
 
 
151 “Mamasapano_NBI-NPS_SIT_Report_REDACTED,” 216. 
152 “Mamasapano_NBI-NPS_SIT_Report_REDACTED,” 181. 
153 “Philippine Senate Committee Report on the Mamasapano Incident,” 142. 
154 “Philippine Senate Committee Report on the Mamasapano Incident,” 142. 
155 “Philippine Senate Committee Report on the Mamasapano Incident,” 51. 
156 “Philippine Senate Committee Report on the Mamasapano Incident,” 52. 
157 “Mamasapano_NBI-NPS_SIT_Report_REDACTED,” 159. 
46 
in the firefight. They also shored up their capabilities, particularly because the bulletproof 
vests, guns, rifles, and ammunition that SAF commandos used in the OPLAN Exodus were 
of high quality.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter reveals the challenges that PSF intelligence community faced at the 
Mamasapano Massacre were complex. This complexity can be seen through the MILF-
GPH peace negotiations, the poor state of affairs of PSF IC, and the increasing pressure on 
the SAF as an elite unit of PSF. The MILF-GPH posed uncertainties as to how to manage 
the HVTs roaming around the controlled territories of MILF which created great impact in 
the preparation for the conduct of OPLAN Exodus. The uncertainties were exacerbated by 
the lack of fusion and sharing within the intelligence community. As an elite unit 
responsible for the neutralization of HVTs, SAF felt pressure to eliminate these leaders 








IV. MARAWI SIEGE 
 
This chapter examines the events that led to the infamous 2017 Marawi Siege 
perpetrated by a conglomeration of radicalized elements of different threat groups 
operating in the southern part of the country. This siege was the longest urban battle fought 
by the Philippine Security Forces (PSF) in modern Philippine history.158 It was also one 
of the most complex in terms of the number of groups represented on each side of the battle. 
For five months—from May 23 to October, 23 2017—the PSF engaged the Dawlah 
Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DI), led by Isnilon Hapilon, which occupied Marawi City 
with the goal of establishing a wilayat or province of ISIS in Southeast Asia.159 According 
to some sources, the DI attacked in reaction to the Philippine Army and National Police 
attempting to capture Hapilon.160 
The occupation of Marawi by these rebel groups prompted the Philippine 
government to declare martial law throughout Mindanao to defeat the DI-inspired groups 
and restore law and order.161 The effort of the PSF to retake the city from terrorist control 
resulted in numerous casualties, including just under 1,000 terrorists, 168 government 
forces, and 87 civilians; massive destruction of infrastructure, including 95 percent of 
structures, estimated at Php 72.02 billion pesos ($1.4 billion), and the displacement of up 
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This chapter begins with an analysis of the main actors in the massacre. It then 
describes the challenges to the PSF as they attempted to maintain the peace in Mindanao. 
In particular, this chapter describes how the intelligence problems affected the country’s 
security apparatus in the performance of their tasks such as competing and shifting 
priorities and the failure of HUMINT networks to provide enough warnings to prevent the 
Marawi Siege. 
 
A. MAIN ACTORS 
  
Five major actors and many secondary actors were involved in the Marawi Siege. 
One loosely affiliated non-state group executed the siege, while five governmental 
organizations formed the core that worked to prevent, fight, and end it.  
DI, the group conducting the siege, was a conglomeration of members of six 
different threat groups: Dawlah Islamiya Basilan led by Hapilon, Dawlah Islamiya Lanao 
led by Adbullah R Maute, Dawlah Islamiya Sarangani led by Abu Mohamad Sabiwang, 
Dawlah Islamiya Maguindanao led by Esmael Adbulmalik, Dawlah Islamiya Sulu led by 
Abu Amar, and Ansarud Dawlatil Islam Luzon (ADIL) led by Rodolph Paras.163 This 
collection was led by Hapilon, “the emir” of DAESH-inspired groups in Southeast Asia 
(DAESH is derived from Dawla Al Islamiya Fi Al Iraq Wa Al Sham, better known as the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). Hapilon was also at the time the leader of the 
Abu Sayyaf Group.164 Hapilon joined the MNLF at age seventeen and the Abu Sayyaf 
Group nine years later.165 The U.S. State Department added him to its Rewards for Justice 
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Program in 2006 with a bounty of $5 million.166 Government forces killed him at the end 
of the Marawi Siege.167  
Secondary non-state actors were the DI-inspired groups composed of the Maute 
Group (comprised of former MILF members and foreign militants), Ansar Khalifa 
Philippines, Jund Al Tawhid, Katiba Al Muhajir, Balik Islam, Bangsamoro Islamic 
Freedom Fighters (BIFF), rogue elements of the MILF, and private armed groups 
(PAGs).168 As of the first quarter of 2017, intelligence validation revealed that combined 
Dawlah Islamiya (DI) East Asia had a total strength of 865 fighters and 263 high-powered 
firearms.169  
The major actors who worked to initially capture Hapilon and then to counter the 
siege came from the PSF, namely the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Philippine National 
Police. Their organization was even more complex than that of the coordinated threat 
groups they faced. In conjunction with OPLAN Kalinaw developed by the JTF ZamPeLan, 
the Joint Task Force-Marawi (JTF-Marawi) was organized to drive the main effort during 
the attempt to take Hapilon.170 As documented by Bgen Vinluan in his after-battle report, 
the JTF-Marawi was comprised of units under the AFP and PNP.171 He explained that the 
JTF-Marawi was organized into thirteen joint task groups, with the Joint Special 
Operations Task Force Trident (JTG-Trident) from AFPJSOG as the main operating 
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component at the main battle area.172 JTG-Trident, in turn, was comprised of elite 
specialized units from the Scout Rangers, Special Forces, Marines, Navy Special 
Operations Group (NAVSOG), and the PNP Special Action Force (PNP SAF).173 These 
JTGs were supported by the Joint Intelligence Task Force Marawi (JITF-Marawi) for all 
intelligence and counterintelligence operations in the main battle area.174 JTF-Marawi was 
led by Brigadier General Rolando Bautista; under him leading the JTF-Trident was Colonel 
Danilo Pamonag.175 Secondary state-based actors hailed from the U.S. Special Operations 
Forces, which provided technical assistance to Philippine government troops for retaking 
Marawi City.176 Australia also contributed by deploying P3 Orion surveillance aircraft for 
intelligence and reconnaissance.177 
B. NATURE OF THE CHALLENGE 
 
 The challenges facing the security forces in the Marawi Siege were similar to the 
challenges seen in the two previous chapters on the Zamboanga Siege and the Mamasapano 
Massacre: the dynamics of failed or failing peace pacts, the complex security situation in 
Mindanao, and the poor state of affairs in the IC. As noted earlier, disagreement on the 
terms of the 1976 peace negotiations with the MNLF resulted in a creation of a splinter 
group, the MILF. From the MILF, two further splinter groups formed, the Abu Sayyaf 
Group in 1992, followed by the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) in 2010. 
These latter two groups form the nucleus of the threat network of the Islamic State in the 
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Philippines and the other related jihadist Islamist-inspired groups. To fully understand 
these challenges, it will be necessary to look at the origins of these groups and the ideology 
they espouse.  
1. The Growth of the Threat Network of Islamic State (IS) in the 
Philippines 
 
The history of the threat network of IS in the Philippines can be traced back to the 
formation of the MNLF by a University of the Philippines professor and ethnic Tausug, 
Nur Misuari, with the goal of liberating the marginalized and regularly attacked Philippine 
Moro Muslims in the southern part of the country.178 Established in 1971 to fight for an 
independent Moro (Islamic) state in Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan, some consider the 
MNLF to be the first well-organized Islamic extremist group in the Philippines.179 Others 
classify the MNLF as primarily an ethnicity- and homeland-based self-determination 
group.180 The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) splintered from the MNLF in 1978 
over leadership and strategic conflicts, especially related to a perception that the state had 
little intention of fulfilling its commitments under the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and a strong 
desire to emphasize defense and practice of Islam in its objectives.181 Its founder, Hashim 
Salamat, rallied dissenting members of the MNLF to form the MILF.182  
Islamic militancy in the Philippines had connections with international terrorist 
organizations like Al Qaeda. In Militant Islam in South East Asia, a Crucible of Terror, 
Zachary Abuza traces the history of MILF contact with Al Qaeda to the period of Soviet 
invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (1979–89), when the MILF sent an estimated 500–
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700 Philippine Moro Muslims to Afghanistan to undergo military training and join the 
mujahideen.183 Mujahideen are guerilla fighters in Islamic countries involved in jihad, 
which by itself means “to struggle” but can also include perceived defense against non-
Muslim forces. In 1982, the Pakistani Intelligence Service began to “recruit radical 
Muslims from around the world to come to Pakistan and fight with the Afghan 
mujahideen.”184 Arab states provided financial and military assistance to the mujahideen, 
while thousands of volunteers from Muslim countries and regions—including a young 
Saudi millionaire named Osama bin Laden—flocked to Pakistan to fight in the anti-Soviet 
jihad.185 Up to 1,000 Southeast Asian Muslims fought with the mujahideen in the 1980s, 
and there is an early Afghanistan connection to most of the radical Islamic groups in the 
Philippines.186 That said, many of the grievances of the MILF have been related to a sense 
of injustice and misrule under the Philippine state.187 
Abu Sayyaf was one of the most violent groups among those that also split off from 
MNLF and whose founder was a veteran of the Soviet Afghan War.188 The Abu Sayyaf 
Group, founded in 1992, became the most notorious Islamist militant group in the 
Philippines and has been considered more of a terrorist organization than an insurgency, 
which better characterizes the primary MNLF and MILF groups. From the Abu Sayyaf 
Group would emerge the “emir” of DI East Asia, Isnilon Hapilon. From then on, several 
groups would evolve that would continue to struggle and fight for a better and more 
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2. The Salafist-Jihadi Inspired Groups 
DI, the group that laid siege to Marawi City in 2017, was inspired by DAESH.189 
Members of this composite group aligned themselves with radical Islamists under the 
Salafist branch of Islam, which itself grew out of Sunnism and its extremist Wahhabi 
Movement.190 If following Salafist-jihadi belief, Muslims strive to spread and implement 
the harshly prescribed teachings of Islam throughout nearly all forms of human activity.191 
They intend to do so by “cleansing” Islamic lands of other religious and cultural influences 
through the waging of holy war or jihad. Salafists consider it every Muslim’s personal duty 
to fight Islam’s perceived enemies. All non-believers are considered to be enemies and 
would have to be combatted through violent and uncompromising military struggle.  
As noted above, it was in 2014 when the then-leader of Abu Sayyaf, Isnilon 
Hapilon, pledged allegiance to DAESH.192 Subsequently, nine other armed groups in 
Mindanao also pledged allegiance to DAESH. With these groups also seeking recognition, 
ISIS leadership sought to identify a regional leader and appoint him as the DI emir.193 
Hapilon presented himself to be that leader and, once appointed emir, courted Southeast 
Asian foreign terrorists for activities in the Southern Philippines and beyond.194 Prominent 
among these men were Dr. Mahmud bin Ahmad, Amin Baco, and Ibnu al Qayyim. In early 
2017, Hapilon Amerul, Emir of Dawlah Islamiyah Fi Basilan, became the head of the 
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3. Intelligence Community’s State of Affairs  
The five-month long siege provided an opportunity for the intelligence community 
(IC) to work together as a team but, in so trying, revealed the IC’s limited resources and 
inherent competition between its units.  
a. Limited Resources 
The Joint Intelligence Task Force-Marawi (JITF-Marawi) was organized to 
integrate all intelligence efforts deploying the available intelligence capabilities, such as 
HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT.195 However, having these primary sources on hand in 
sufficient quantity was a daunting challenge.  
HUMINT was the backbone of the intelligence operations against the DI prior to 
the Marawi Siege. In the second week of February, 2017, the IC’s already limited 
HUMINT capability diminished with the death of two AFP Intelligence Service operatives. 
The deaths of Major Jericho P. Mangalus, Assistant Group Commander of the Military 
Intelligence Group 10 (MIG 10) in the area, and Corporal Bryan Libot, delivered a heavy 
blow to the surveillance and intelligence operations against the threat groups.196 It was 
later discovered that the HUMINT asset of MIG 10 had been severely compromised, 
leading to Major Mangalus and his operatives being ambushed, leading to his and one of 
his intelligence operative’s untimely deaths. These losses blinded the MIG 10 to the plans, 
intentions, and courses of actions of DI. It would again take considerable time, effort, and 
resources to develop viable HUMINT assets who had the proper access and placement 
inside terrorist organizations, in this case the different threat groups operating from Marawi 
City. 
The SIGINT capability (direction finder) had also been degraded due to advances 
in technology. This direction-finder capability allowed analyzing voice transmissions from 
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radio signals and other data detected by emitters.197 The movement monitored through this 
mode became limited, especially when the DI noticed that they were monitored through 
their radios.198 Further, other SIGINT capabilities using the graphic-user interface and 
global system for mobile communications (GSM) intercept system, designed to detect 
signal emissions and weak radio transmissions were limited.199 Their antennas are bulky, 
cannot be used effectively for covert SIGINT operations, and require a consistent power 
supply.200 
Finally, IMINT capability was also limited. JITF-Marawi used drones to monitor 
the areas of operation. The Philippines IC employed intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) platforms—aircraft (P3 Orion) and UAVs (Scan Eagle and Puma)— 
that were provided by the United States and Australia and which provided real-time 
information.201 But because the number of drones was limited, 24-hour monitoring of the 
pre-battle and battle areas posed a challenge to JITF-Marawi.  
b. Competition for High-Value Targets (HVTs) 
The hunt for Isnilon Hapilon, and Abdullah and Omar Maute, the most prominent 
members of DI East Asia, intensified as these HVTs evaded several focused military 
operations conducted by JTF ZamPeLan from 2013–17. However, the PSF intelligence 
units had gathered significant information on the whereabouts of the target HVTs. On May 
22, 2017, MIG 10 presented a target packet to JTF ZamPeLan for possible neutralization 
of the Maute brothers after they were sighted and confirmed at their compound at 
Mindanao State University in Marawi City.202 The same day, while neutralization 
planning was ongoing, the Maute brothers operation was put on standby because a priority 
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target packet, Bingo, was presented by the Naval Intelligence and Security Group (NISG), 
this time with Hapilon as the target.203 These conflicting target packets suggested that the 
intelligence units in the area competed rather than cooperated with each other. Based on 
personal experience and informal discussions with colleagues at the time, there seemed to 
be a contest among the intelligence units involved in counterterrorism to take down the 
HVTs—especially those targets which could garner high financial and status rewards.  
The enormous rewards for HVTs certainly provided a motivation for the IC, but 
this did not necessarily lead to collaboration in hitting the HVTs. The capture of Hapilon 
had an outstanding reward of Php 7.4 million pesos ($148,000) from the Philippine 
government and $5 million (Php 250 million pesos) from the U.S. State Department. 
Further, President Duterte offered another Php 10 million pesos ($200,000) for Hapilon 
and Php 5 million each ($100,000) for the Maute brothers. It is not farfetched that 
competition existed among the intelligence units and that their motivations were, in part, 
the staggering rewards that they could get from the capture of the leaders of the terrorist 
groups.  
C. PROBLEMS WITH INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
The Marawi Siege was preceded by several warnings of an impending attack in 
Marawi City, with solid information coming from the IC community and even the DI 
directly. The IC had been monitoring the movements of HVTs in the area and was giving 
precise, tactical intelligence to decision makers, particularly the military in the months 
leading up to the siege. Yet, despite these early warnings, the IC was challenged by 
conflicting demands, such as focusing too narrowly on the HVTs, and not on the other 
members of their groups, and lack of adequate HUMINT prior to and during the siege.  
1. Failed Operations, Despite Adequate Early Warnings  
The first warning came from intelligence indications that the threat groups were 
unifying their ranks prior to the siege. In December 2016, six months before the siege, 
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elements of the Abu Sayyaf Group were sighted in Lanao Del Sur, a province in Mindanao, 
and were reported going to the city of Butig, presumably to link up with the Maute Group. 
This prompted government troops to initiate military operations to neutralize Hapilon and 
the Maute leadership.204 The government conducted air strikes to curtail the capabilities 
of these threat groups, but Hapilon and the Maute brothers evaded the government troops. 
The terrorists even delivered a warning, in the form of a threat, to the government.205 In a 
speech delivered on December 12, 2016, President Duterte revealed that the Maute Group 
had threatened to burn Marawi if the government did not stop its military operations in 
those areas.206 Another warning came in January 2017, when intelligence reports indicated 
that Hapilon, with about 100 fully armed men, was in Butig, on a mission called hijrah, a 
migration journey to wage war against the infidels, and declare Lanao Del Sur the Province 
as a wilayat or Islamic State province.207 These warnings prompted the government to 
launch several military operations dubbed haribon uno, dos, tres, and kwatro.208 Yet, 
Hapilon, the Maute brothers, and their groups were still able to establish themselves in 
Marawi City. 
2. Competing Priorities 
Intelligence during the early stage of the siege was vague and too narrowly 
focused.209 This affected the planning and execution of operations. For example, the 
number of fighters accompanying the HVTs was not revealed by the IC. Dr. Rommel 
Banlaoi, Executive Director of Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorist 
Research, has claimed that there was a lapse in gathering of reliable and accurate 
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intelligence.210 He argues that the PSF was surprised by the strength of the opposition 
forces they encountered when they tried to serve the arrest warrant on Hapilon. He believes 
this lack of information resulted, in part, from the IC focusing so directly to the HVTs, not 
their larger organizations. The IC was unaware of DI’s grand plan to seize Marawi City, 
overlooking or misinterpreting the fighters who were prepositioned in different areas of the 
city. Moreover, despite earlier actionable intelligence, the IC only had a vague sense of the 
locations of the HVTs just before and during the siege. Only after interrogations of captured 
fighters were conducted to rescue hostages was it clear as to the exact locations of 
HVTs.211 
3. Failure in HUMINT Networks and Shifting Priorities 
During the siege, the HUMINT capability (recruited action agents), in particular, 
encountered difficulty in relaying information, which affected the accuracy and timeliness 
of information.212 The agent handlers could not force the action agents to give significant 
information when they were at the height of the firefight, especially inside the main battle 
area.213 Further, these terrorist groups practice high security awareness. Certainly, 
HUMINT capability was degraded with the deaths of Major Mangalus and his operative 
from MIG 10 in Marawi prior to the siege. This impacted the capability of the intelligence 
units to validate the information regarding the threat groups. The commanding officer of 
JSOU3 revealed that the target HVTs being tracked by MIG 10 were Isnilon Hapilon, the 
emir of Islamic State East Asia (ISEA) and the Maute brothers, Omar and Abdullah, who 
led the Marawi Siege.  
The grand plan of the Marawi Siege may have been detected earlier and the 
government forces may have prevented the large-scale destruction brought about by the 
siege if monitoring of these HVTs was not cut off by lack of communication between agent 
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handlers and action agents. This failure was admitted by the Defense Secretary Lorenzana 
during a media interview when he was asked why it was taking so long to neutralize the 
groups responsible for the Marawi Siege.214 Further, the failure was also reiterated by the 
AFP Chief of Staff General Eduardo Ano when he disclosed in a media interview that there 
was a failure with the local intelligence network.215 General Ano further disclosed that the 
government failed to appreciate the threats groups’ strengths, plans, and intentions. 
4. Assessment of the Threat  
The intent, capability, and opportunity framework sheds light on the circumstances 
leading up to the Marawi Siege. The intent of DI to conduct the Marawi Siege can be traced 
back to their losses from focused military operations in Basilan and Butig, Lanao Del Sur 
Province, and their desire to be taken seriously. The president’s recognition of the DI’s 
threat to burn Marawi City shows their intent was clearly known, extreme, and 
violent.216With this danger, the different threat groups started to unify as one so that they 
could prove their worth representing ISIS in Southeast Asia.217 These threat groups had 
simultaneously pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014. Then, since only Hapilon was 
recognized as an international terrorist leader, ISIS leadership directed him to unify the 
threat groups that pledged their allegiance.218 These are clear signs of DI’s intent and 
perceived need to make a big show, but intelligence did not realize the grand plan, because 
the IC did not share information between units or to the central IC command.  
The capability of DI was tested several times prior to the Marawi Siege. The Davao 
bombings in September 2016, the siege in Butig Lanao Del Sur Municipal Hall in 
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November 2016, and the attempted bombing at the U.S. Embassy in Manila demonstrated 
its capacity to sow terror.219 These events are intelligence indicators that the threats of DI 
were real and should not be discounted. Additionally, Commander Lt Col Almodovar of 
the 3rd Scout Ranger Battalion, which was part of the liberation of Marawi, admitted that 
the capability of the threat groups was still strong enough after the siege in Butig to conduct 
a similar crisis elsewhere.220  
DI also exploited the opportunity dimension during the Marawi Siege. JTF 
ZamPeLan decided to prioritize the neutralization of Hapilon early in the morning of May 
23, 2017 because he was very mobile and could leave the target area at any time. Target 
packet Bingo, focused on the Maute brothers, however, had general information and would 
need more critical information. The IC operating units requested a few hours to conduct 
the necessary validation of the targets so that they could meet the requirements for a raid 
or direct action.221 The direct action was executed as planned, but Hapilon, again, escaped, 
this time because the raiding units encountered fierce resistance from the coordinated 
terrorist groups, which then started launching the siege of Marawi.222 This opportunity, 
created when the IC and security forces had diverging priorities and weakened access to 
data, marks the DI’s simultaneous attacks on different areas in Marawi City. 
D. CONCLUSION 
 The siege in Marawi materialized after earlier warnings made by the DI as the 
government continued to pound their lairs with airstrikes. These warnings were 
downplayed by decision makers because of the impact taking action would have had on 
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the booming economy.223 The IC was generally on top of the situation but was confronted 
with the conflicting challenges of integrating vast amounts of information and coping with 
missing pieces because every intel unit had its own agenda of neutralizing the HVTs with 
high rewards. However, after the botched raid to serve the arrest warrant against Hapilon, 
the IC began to uncover the grand plan of the DI to occupy Marawi at the start of Ramadan. 
Nonetheless, the precise tactical intelligence gathered after the raid was not enough to 
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V. ANALYSIS 
Amy Zegart explains the importance of theories as a tool for understanding everyday 
life. She describes “the purpose of theories in simplifying complexities, identifying the 
cause and effect relationships, and suggesting why and how some causes are more 
important than others.”224 In this chapter, the theories of preventive action and patron-
client relations are used to explain the failure to prevent the Zamboanga Siege, 
Mamasapano Massacre, and Marawi Siege. The lack of two elements needed for preventive 
action—precise tactical intelligence and decision maker’s receptivity—validates the utility 
of this theory to help explain the outcome of the three cases reviewed. In the Zamboanga 
Siege, the first element was not satisfied prompting the second element to be disregarded. 
In the Mamasapano Massacre, the first element was satisfied but the second element was 
not. In the Marawi Siege, the first element was satisfied but was not enough to prevent the 
grand scale terror attack the DI launched. As for the utility of the second theory, the deep 
influence of patron-client relations in Mindanao appears to have negatively affected the 
gathering and sharing of intelligence from the different threat groups that perpetrated these 
three terrorist incidents.  
 
A. THEORY OF PREVENTIVE ACTION 
The theory of preventive action was instrumental in the analysis of each terrorist 
incident. It simplified the study of each complex case and explained why the PSF was 
unable to prevent them.  
1. Zamboanga Siege 
Despite open sources that provided numerous potential warnings of the MNLF’s 
plans and intentions, many in both the diffusion and fusion arenas of the IC interpreted its 
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actions to be strategic and did not request immediate action from decision makers.225 The 
IC noted that various protest actions by MNLF were peaceful and were therefore not 
alarmed, since the MNLF had previously conducted similar activities without escalating to 
violence. It can be argued that the IC may not have had a clear picture of the situations, 
because it lacked all the information needed or the information may not have seemed 
relevant as it was portrayed. Consequently, the IC overlooked further signs of pending 
unrest, such as the successive meetings conducted by Misuari to his top leaders to pursue 
their quest for independence and self-determination.226 
As noted in Chapter III, it was only learned during the siege that Nur Misuari had 
conducted a series of significant and abnormally large meetings in various areas in 
Mindanao. These meetings had approximately 3,150 attendees from different areas.227 The 
JSOG After Battle Report further revealed that the goal of these meetings was to establish 
a Bangsamoro Republik which would cover Sulu, Basilan, and the Zamboanga Peninsula. 
Had these meetings been known to the IC, they could have better articulated their 
prediction of potential outcomes given the state of the uncertainty and ambiguity of the 
information space. The JSOG report noted that other activities, such as peace caravans, 
leader consultations, and a series of smaller meetings conducted by the MNLF, appeared 
strategic and to not pose an immediate threat to the security of the country, so they were 
not acted upon accordingly. 
Yet, Musuari made no secret of his displeasure with negotiations and his goals 
leading up to the siege. On July 25, 2013, Nur Misuari warned the GRP that he may opt to 
declare an independent republic if the Malacañan Palace pushed through the closure of the 
GRP-MNLF 1996 final peace accord.228 He disclosed that he received a furnished copy of 
the letter from the Malacañan Palace addressed to the Organization of Islamic Conference 
(OIC) dated March 21, 2013. The letter requested that the OIC close the tripartite action in 
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reviewing the process on the final implementation of the 1996 peace accord to 
accommodate the Framework Agreement for Bangsamoro (FAB) of the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF).229 Before the Zamboanga Siege, Nur Misuari sent a clear 
warning, consolidated his forces, and regained the sympathy of his supporters through the 
activities they had conducted. In hindsight, intelligence analysts, by this time, should have 
carefully evaluated the probabilities and repercussions if such actions were initiated. They 
should have advised decision makers for a needed intervention to mitigate the increased 
risks that the MNLF posed to the Mindanao security situation. 
In yet another missed opportunity for IC action, Misuari declared with strong 
determination the independence of the Bangsamoro Republik in Talipao, Sulu, on August 
12, 2013.230 This was a manifest act of rebellion against the Republic of the Philippines 
and also a call for the MNLF armed components, specifically those loyal to Misuari, to 
raise arms.231 Thus, those who supported this move by Misuari are called Rouge MNLF-
Misuari Group or Rouge MNLF Elements (RME).  
These warning signs should have been taken seriously by intelligence analysts. 
Back in 2001, a faction of the MNLF loyal to Misuari conducted a similar attack known as 
the Cabatangan Siege to stop the elections that would replace Nur Misuari as ARMM 
governor.232 One factor that can lead to misinterpretation of information is the perceived 
bias that any analyst may possess. Analysts grapple with their organizational bias and 
group-think. For instance, the PSF, in conjunction with the Office of the Presidential 
Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) and the MILF, downplayed the threat by claiming 
that MNLF could not muster a significant number of supporters to derail the peace 
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process.233 This eventually led to ineffective evaluation of the threat, especially given that 
some evidence was to the contrary.  
The views of experts of Philippine political and Islamic studies are yet another 
source of information that intel analysts can integrate to better understand strategic 
warnings. In the weeks leading up to the siege, political analyst Clarita Carlos shared with 
journalists her concerns about recent actions by Misuari and stated that Misuari should not 
be ignored.234She went so far as to advise the government to consider talking with the 
MNLF because these actions, left unchecked, could have serious repercussions. Dean 
Julkipli Wadi of the University of the Philippines Institute for Islamic Studies shared 
Carlos’s sentiments.235 He lamented that Misuari was left out of the Bangsamoro 
Framework Agreement between the government and the MILF. Both experts supported the 
idea that the government should expand the peace talks in Mindanao to include other Moro 
groups and not exclude others, especially influential ones like the MNLF.236 
Considering the advice of these experts, along with open-source warnings directly 
from Musuari and the MNLF’s history of violence when its leader’s grasp on power was 
threatened, intelligence analysts should have prompted GPH decision makers to heed the 
call for a deliberate response from the government. The fact that the MNLF had previously 
conducted violent activities, had forces and resources for violence, and had unilaterally 
declared their freedom, the IC should have advised the security forces to proactively thwart 
any threats that could undermine national security. Thus, two elements of the theory of 
preventive action—accurate information and receptivity of decision makers—were not 
met, resulting in the Zamboanga Siege.  
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2. Mamasapano Massacre  
 
The Mamasapano Massacre came about when decision makers were unable to 
create an effective, deliberate response to resolve the confusion and lack of information on 
the ground during their operational retreat. There was inaccurate and incomplete 
information, which started with a lack of diffusion and fusion before the PNP-SAF 
operation and continued throughout the massacre. The theory of preventive action requires 
precise, tactical information that warrants the receptivity of decision makers and gives them 
confidence to act in a timely manner. These two elements of the theory—accurate 
information and receptivity of decision makers—were not met, and thus the massacre 
occurred.  
a. Inaccurate Information 
Inaccurate and untimely information from decision makers, like the director of the 
Special Action Force (DSAF) and the suspended PNP chief (CPNP), contributed to poor 
planning and coordination, as well as an inadequate response and delayed decision making 
during the Mamapasano Massacre. One glaring shortcoming was the form of 
communication—short message system (SMS) or text message—used in the lead up and 
at the height of this SAF law enforcement operation.237 The key decision makers—from 
the president of the Philippines, the suspended chief of the Philippine National Police, the 
Western Mindanao commander, the director of SAF, the 6th Infantry Division commander, 
and other ground commanders—communicated through texts. Written messages, 
especially short ones, can be misinterpreted due to a lack of context and substance. In 
addition, delivery of texts can be delayed because of interference in the system of network 
providers. These incomplete, delayed messages increased inaccuracy and negatively 
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impacted the response of major decision makers.238 These problems were encountered 
during diffusion and fusion of intelligence. 
The failure of the director of SAF to report accurate and timely information to the 
OIC-PNP regarding the status of the beleaguered commandos prevented a quick response 
from the government.239 The SAF director, when he was asked by the OIC-PNP through 
SMS while the firefight was ongoing about the report of eleven SAF commandos killed in 
action, replied that the report needed confirmation.240 The board’s report also revealed that 
the SAF director doubted the information, since the report came from the AFP, and instead 
claimed, contrary to the intelligence, that there were personnel wounded in action, but not 
killed. Further, the SAF director, also provided inaccurate information to the 6ID 
commander when he informed the latter of the ongoing law enforcement operations by the 
SAF, claiming that the SAF operations were supported by the Maguindanao Provincial 
Police Office and Police Regional Office of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM) when, in fact, the police units in the area were unaware of the operations until 
the day the firefight ensued.241 
It appears that the suspended PNP chief continued to provide inaccurate 
information throughout the massacre. When asked by the Philippine president why the 160 
personnel of SAF deployed in the operation could not contain 15–20 security details of 
HVTs, the suspended chief replied that SAF was still containing the opposing forces and 
were supported by mechanized and artillery units from the AFP.242 The truth was that the 
SAF was being annihilated by the opposing combined forces of MILF, BIFF, and PAGs as 
reported in the Senate Committee report. The units that were supposed to provide the 
necessary fire support were still on standby for deployment to assist the SAF 
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Commandos.243 Furthermore, the suspended chief forwarded a text message that he 
claimed came from his contact inside the MILF.244The message said that a directive was 
issued by the MILF Central Committee to not participate in the ongoing SAF operations in 
the area and that the opposing forces that the SAF was confronting were just about 15–20 
armed elements.245 This information was not validated by other sources and turned out to 
be inaccurate.246 The contact of the PNP chief inside the MILF may have exaggerated or 
understated the information that he relayed to his patron. 
In turn, these actions and inactions by two major actors—the suspended PNP chief 
and SAF director)—in the execution of OPLAN Exodus did not create a sense of urgency 
to compel the proper response to rescue the SAF commandos who were fighting for their 
lives. The sense of urgency for other decision makers to act was not delivered during the 
struggle because two critical elements of intelligence—accuracy and timeliness—were not 
established. The information was inaccurate in the sense that it lacked substance and truth 
in terms of the 5Ws and 1H (who, what, when, why, where and how). Also, the information 
could not be validated through other means. As the relayed information did not reflect the 
real scenario, the tragedy unfolded. 
b. Lack of Receptivity of Decision Makers 
 The receptivity of decision makers to act during the ongoing crisis in Mamasapano 
was low due to divergent priorities, lack of adherence to standard operating procedures, 
and the consideration of the MILF-GPH peace negotiations. One policymaker whose 
decision to engage could have made a big difference in the crisis was the commander of 
the 6th Infantry Division. As the PNP Board of Inquiry found, the 6ID commander refused 
to give the go signal for artillery fire support, in part, because doing so would likely 
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negatively affect the ongoing GPH-MILF peace negotiations.247 The urgency of the need 
was communicated through the SOS message of beleaguered SAF commandos begging for 
the badly needed artillery fire support. The first request of artillery support made by the 
SAF director to the 6ID commander was when SAF commandos were engaged early in the 
morning.248 The SAF director ordered his deputy to personally call the commander of the 
1st Mechanized Brigade under 6ID.249 Another request was also made by the suspended 
PNP chief through the commander of WESMINCOM, the unit where the 6ID was under 
operational control.250  
 Yet, the 6ID commander declined such requests and reasoned that the requests 
could not be granted because the standard operating procedure (SOP) for the employment 
of artillery support had not been met: there was no forward observer (FO), the location of 
the friendly forces in terms of grid coordinates (GC) were not established, and the 
information available to him was insufficient.251 With the GPH-MILF ongoing peace 
negotiations on the line, the 6ID commander was not receptive to taking a risk on 
unverifiable intelligence. The 6ID commander, however, ordered the 1st Mechanized 
Brigade and 45th Infantry Battalion to exhaust all other actions to ease the pressure from 
the beleaguered SAF commandos, but these were not enough.252  
 
3. Marawi Siege 
The question of how the Marawi Siege could have been prevented or ended sooner 
can be answered, in part, by studying the elements of the theory of preventive action. As 
noted, the first element is that precise and tactical intelligence must be provided for 
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decision makers to act. The precise intelligence that was gathered as a basis of the focused 
military operations before the start of the siege helped foil the larger plan of a major 
terrorist attack by the DI. In a statement before the media, General Ed Ano revealed the 
grand plan of DI to seize the entire city of Marawi on the first day of the holy month of 
Ramadan on May 26, 2017, to emulate what the ISIS leader, Abu Bakr Al Bagdadhi, did 
in Mosul, Iraq, on the first day of the holy month in June 2014.253 This included the 
planned attack of Camp Ranao, the headquarters of the 103rd Army Brigade. With these 
two strategic targets, DI hoped the people of Marawi would support them in establishing 
the wilayat, or province of ISIS, to show the world that they could do so in Southeast 
Asia.254 However, what happened in Marawi foiled this planned bigger terror attack that 
could have shocked the country and sowed heightened animosity between Muslims and 
Christians.255 
The incomplete intelligence on DI’s larger plans impacted the ability of decision 
makers to adequately assess the situation.256 As such, the decision makers were not 
receptive to the earlier intelligence that was gathered. Prior to the siege, an intelligence 
report that the 103rd Army Brigade based in Marawi was attacked by the DI was ignored 
and downplayed by the commander of the Camp Ranao where the 103rd Army Brigade is 
located.257 Accordingly, the intelligence report was not validated by his own intelligence 
officer. Moreover, the presence of ISIS was admitted to by Major General Carlito Galvez, 
WESMINCOM commander, when he said that the “threat of ISIS is coming” but implied 
that the threat was not highlighted by political leaders because the country’s economy was 
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doing well, and they did not want to discourage investment.258 He claimed that the 
booming economy and investments may be affected if ISIS is portrayed to be present in 
Mindanao.259 A few weeks before the siege, this view was supported by political science 
professor Richard Heydarian when he told the media that the Philippines was already 
getting bad publicity, so he claimed that the government did not want to add another 
concern that may push away investors and tourists.260 It can be surmised that the camp 
commander was not receptive of the intelligence that he was getting from different sources 
because of high-level priorities.  
Decision makers began to be very receptive after the start of the siege because of 
videos and other documents—accurate and complete intelligence—recovered from the safe 
house where Hapilon had been hiding.261 These sources revealed that, indeed, the Army 
camp was a target of surveillance by the DI.262 The precise tactical intelligence gathered 
after the raid of the government forces changed the attitude of the decision makers on the 
issue of ISIS. With these and integrated intelligence from different sources, decision 
makers then had a clearer picture of the situation. The precise intelligence gathered through 
tactical-level operations, in turn, helped make the decision makers very receptive to react 
and take the necessary actions.  
Clearly, these two elements of the theory of preventive action can be identified in 
the Marawi Siege, but it must be emphasized that this precise tactical-level intelligence did 
not come early enough to prevent the initial planned coordinated attacks of the DI in several 
parts of Marawi. Aside from the resistance that operating troops met before serving the 
warrants of arrest to Hapilon, the DI was able to seize the Amay Pakpak Medical Center 
and burn down the Senator Ninoy Aquino Foundation and Dansalan Colleges, the 
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Cathedral of Our Lady of Perpetual Help, the Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital, and the 
Marawi Police Station.263 Further, they freed 68 inmates at the Marawi City jail, ransacked 
banks in the city, controlled the three major bridges (Mapandi, Bangolo, and Masiu) linking 
the west and east areas of the city, established roadblocks, took hostage a number of 
civilians (Muslims and Christians), and kidnapped Father Chito Suganob of Saint Mary’s 
Church.264  
These actions marked the first day of the siege, which overwhelmed the government 
troops. Hence, decision makers recommended to the Philippine president that he declare 
martial law.265 Although met by fierce criticism, it was the most appropriate act to prevent 
the spread of the conflict more broadly in Mindanao.266 Martial law established 
checkpoints, which temporarily prevented other terrorist groups from participating in the 
plan of DI to control a territory like Marawi as a final requirement in the recognition of a 
wilayat in Southeast Asia.267 Then, an all-out military offensive started, which lasted for 
almost five months of fierce battle, resulting in the death of 920 DI fighters, 165 
government troops, and at least 45 civilians.268 
 
B. THEORY OF PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONS 
 The theory of patron-client relations remains one of the most influential in the study 
of Philippine politics because it aptly explains significant dynamics in the democratization 
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process of the country.269 It is described as “the reciprocal, dyadic relationship of the 
patron, a person of power, influence, and status, who helps or protects a client who, in 
return, provides loyalty, political allegiance, and other services to the patron.”270 This 
dynamic within threat groups makes collection of intelligence more challenging. When 
widespread within the IC, data is siloed and not shared, the professionalism of analysts 
suffers, and patrons’ decisions are compromised by self-interest. 
 Patron-client relations play a significant role within the IC itself. Often, 
commanders who have power, influence, and status would fill in officers and intelligence 
operatives who have their trust and confidence. These commanders are the job-providing 
patrons, while the officers and intelligence operatives become clients, giving back through 
protecting and helping their patron. This relationship became a culture in the organization 
that greatly affected intelligence operations. Often, from firsthand observation by this 
author, commanders rely on their relationship to an officer or operative rather than the 
capabilities of doing the intelligence job. Therefore, even if an officer or operative lacks 
the expertise of an intelligence professional, or, at worst, is not an intelligence practitioner, 
they are chosen by commanders by virtue of their trust and confidence in the individual’s 
loyalty. As a result, even if there are systems and rules in place to encourage 
professionalism in the IC, these systems are often bypassed. Maintaining and building 
networks of patron-client relations may be considered more important than effectively 
fulfilling their primary duties of gathering intelligence for the organization. Indeed, 
hampered by patron-client relationships, it can be surmised that the challenges faced by the 
IC to fulfill its mission were too great and that the IC lacked the capacity or cooperation to 
conduct its operations effectively. 
1. Zamboanga Siege 
The IC’s ability to gather information on RME-MG’s capability to stage the 
Zamboanga Siege attack appears to have been hindered by patron-client relationships. 
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MNLF members, for instance, were able to establish an arms cache and food supplies in 
their target areas or barangays. As stated in the Philippine Senate Resolution 393 as an 
authority to conduct an inquiry on the incident, the RME-MG surreptitiously transported 
firearms into the city and stored them as early as January 2013, notwithstanding the 
Commission on Election (COMELEC) gun ban during the period.271 An understanding of 
patron-client relations sheds light on how, at the height of the COMELEC gun ban and the 
proximity of law enforcement agencies, the RME-MG was able to transport and store 
firearms unnoticed or at least unreported. These powerful dyadic relationships also help 
explain other failings to collect and act upon intelligence prior to the Zamboanga Siege. 
Given that the RME-MG sustained a three-week firefight against government 
forces suggests that the attack was properly planned and well-funded.272 Yet, local sources 
did not report any suspicious activity. Misuari, as a person of influence, power, and status, 
continuously helped and protected a number of MNLF fighters and their families who were 
loyal to him, who, in return, provided political allegiance and other services in order to 
preserve their own interests.273 The patron, Misuari, was able to rally his clientele RME-
MG fighters to stage the attack in Zamboanga City. The norms of loyalty and obligations 
that exists within this patron-client relationship contributed to the security that both parties 
relied on. The reciprocal relationships of patron and client are deep and cannot be easily 
swayed or influenced by other motivations that the IC looks to exploit to get information. 
This poses a challenge to intelligence agents to find a cooperative insider who has excellent 
access and placement inside the MNLF.  
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Intelligence agents faced the characteristics of typical amorphous, latent, and 
elusive patron-client relations of Misuari and RME-MG.274 The relationship between 
Habier Malik as the head of the RME-MG and Nur Misuari is especially worth noting 
because it connected other individuals into cooperating when called into action. Misuari, 
as a powerful person became the symbol of what drives the special relationships that exist 
within the RME-MG. This special relationship, because it is informal and no records show 
their connection, was a challenge for infiltrating and penetrating intelligence agents to 
overcome. Hence, from an intelligence validation point of view, it is difficult to trust data 
if not coming from an RME-MG insider. Thus, Misuari and RME-MG could rely on the 
patron-client system to protect their shared interests against mutual adversaries, just as their 
dyadic relationship protected the patron and clients through mutual obligation and a level 
of reciprocity. 
2. Mamasapano Massacre 
Patron-client relations played a significant role in the Mamasapano Massacre with 
the PNP chain of command being violated. The chain of command, also called “command 
channel refers to the succession of leadership from a superior to a subordinate through 
which the command is exercised.”275 The OPLAN Exodus’ chain of command was 
comprised of the Philippine President Benigno Aquino, as the Commander in Chief at the 
top; under him suspended Chief of the PNP, Alan Purisima; then the Director of SAF, 
Getulio Napenas; and finally, the Battalion/Company Commanders under SAF. Although, 
technically not in the chain of command, the president’s alter ego, his cabinet secretary of 
Department of Interior and Local Government, known as SILG Manuel Roxas, was part of 
the chain of command because of his supervisory function over PNP and close personal 
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relationship with the president.276 With the chief of the PNP under suspension because of 
graft and corruption charges, the OIC-PNP Leonardo Espina was designated to act on his 
behalf.277  
The violation of the chain of command was evidenced with patron-client relations 
playing a vital role during the planning, preparation, and execution of the OPLAN Exodus. 
As became apparent reading a PNP report, members of the chain of command were tightly 
linked in such relationships with each other.278 The suspended PNP Chief Purisima was 
the president’s client. SAF Director Napenas was the client of the suspended PNP Chief 
Purisima. The suspended PNP Chief Purisima was at the center of this relationship, being 
the client of Philippine President Aquino and a patron of the SAF Director Napenas. The 
patron-client relationship between the suspended Chief PNP Purisima and the President 
Aquino goes back to 1987 when the former was designated as a security detail of the latter, 
a presidential son of former President Corazon Aquino.279 Their patron-client relationship 
was emphasized when the younger Aquino became the president and appointed Purisima 
as the PNP chief in 2012.  
However, as the Senate investigation of the massacre revealed, although Purisima, 
the chief of the PNP, was suspended in December 2014, he continued to influence the 
operations against the HVTs, in this case, OPLAN Exodus. This action, which did not 
follow the rule of law, was endorsed by the president, Purisima’s patron. The investigation 
also uncovered that during the planning and execution process, the Secretary of Interior 
and Local Government (SILG) and OIC PNP were denied knowledge of the SAF 
operations. On January 9, 2015, although Purisima was already suspended, he still 
participated on the briefing presentation of the concept of operations of OPLAN Exodus 
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with the president by the SAF director.280 He even instructed the SAF director after that 
meeting to not tell the other two decision makers, SILG and OIC PNP, about the upcoming 
SAF operations.281 Further, despite the SILG and OIC PNP being part of the formal but 
not informal chain of command, they admitted that they only knew about OPLAN Exodus 
when the SAF commandos were already engaged with the opposing forces.282  
With this, top-level patron-client relations within the IC, PNP, and Office of the 
President created a negative impact on the response of the decision makers’ ability to act 
quickly during the constrained time when the SAF commandos were already under fire. 
The planned mechanisms designed to mitigate the threat to the SAF were not executed 
because of a lack of information sharing outside the tight-knit, patron-client bonds 
discussed here. Further, these patron-client relations negatively affected intelligence-
community operations, with intelligence operators unable to get quality intelligence from 
one another in a timely manner.  
The patron-client nature of society and culture of Moro-Muslims communities in 
Mamasapano also hampered the IC’s ability to gather information from the target area. In 
this author’s field experience, tight-knit, clan-based communities tend to be suspicious of 
unknown personalities coming into their territory. Further, they are aware of the presence 
of HVTs in the community and tend to protect them, because these HVT personalities also 
protect them in terms of their presence, given that government forces are hesitant to come 
into their turf. The symbiotic relationship is cemented by their economic and political 
reliance on each other in the Philippine culture where personal connections, not rule of law 
nor formal institutions, open doors and even ensure survival.283 These bonds are further 
solidified through familial ties and religious communities.284Reliance on patron-client 
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relations is exacerbated by the fact that the surrounding area is rather volatile, being 
controlled by MILF, BIFF and PAGs, not state institutions and peace officers.285  
On the other hand, the patron-client relations can benefit intelligence professionals 
if somebody learns how to exploit these relations. For instance, my own experience as an 
intelligence officer developing the intelligence project Firebird is a case in point.286 
Finding a viable HUMINT asset is a challenge. The agent acquisition process can only be 
successful if you are able to pinpoint the patron of a certain client candidate. Fortunately, 
the intel unit that I led maintains a good list of barangay intelligence networks (BINs) led 
by probable patrons. BINs are informants within the security environment. They provide 
information for any unusual incidents and can be a source for validation of collected 
information within their areas. Usually, these BINs have business interests in the cities or 
urban areas and still collaborate with their clients in the rural area. The recruitment of an 
agent for case OPLAN Firebird started with the patron BIN. This particular patron BIN 
then introduced an intelligence operative to his clients and established their connection. 
The tedious agent acquisition process of spotting, recruitment, and operational testing of 
potential agents is then easily provided by the patron BIN to the intelligence through the 
patron-client relations.  
3. Marawi Siege 
The Marawi Siege was a result of the deep influence of patron-client relations that 
existed within the political clans in Mindanao. The clans tolerated or supported the DI 
fighters in whatever way they could to support their cause. One such influential clan was 
the Mautes from Butig Lanao Del Sur. The family of Maute was identified by the military 
to be part of the organizers of the siege.287 Cayamora Maute, the father of Omar and 
Abdullah Maute, was a member of the MILF. Farhana Romato Maute, the mother of Omar 
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and Abdullah, was identified as the financier because she runs a good business in Marawi 
as well as in Manila. The family conducted terrorist training at an abandoned MILF camp 
in Butig Lanao Del Sur for their recruits. As a powerful clan, they become the patron of 
their many clients, persons who worked in their businesses, and some became their recruits, 
then eventually their fighters. Accordingly, most sub leaders are relatives of the Maute and 
Romato clans.288 Hence, the PSF describes them as the Maute Group.  
The Maute Group is a typical structure of an elite family in Mindanao. They 
maintain an armed group to protect their political and economic interests. Further, clans 
justify their resistance to the duly delegated authority. A clan leader, Norodin Lucman 
stated that, what happened in Marawi was the continuation of the colonial war between the 
government and the Moro people that has existed for centuries.289 He claimed that most of 
the problems in Mindanao are settled in war and that the clan is ready to fight on if the war 
comes again. This statement showed the links that exist in patron-client relations between 
the sympathizers and supporters to DI. Further, his statement explains why the operating 
troops observed some houses with an armed cache, black armbands (ISIS logo), packed 
baggage, and food ready to support the DI.290 Some clans in Mindanao still believed that 
they were still under colonial rule, this time by the Filipinos.  
On the other hand, one politician claimed that the Marawi Siege could have been 
prevented if the government acknowledged the patron-client relations. According to 
Samira Gutoc, a member of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission, what happened in 
Marawi was a result of not allowing traditional indigenous mediation processes to settle 
the crisis.291 The patrons, as highly respected members of society and having significant 
informal authority, can bring people, their clients, in dispute to an amicable settlement.292 
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These clans or elite families continue to influence the political landscape in 
Mindanao and challenge the legitimacy of the Philippine government. They have used all 
possible ways whether political, religious, ethnic lines, and even bribery to advance their 
interests. Accordingly, during the siege, threat groups sent feelers to negotiate for their 
escape from the main battle area using the influential political clans and these threat groups 
were offering the staggering amount of PhP 10 million ($200,000) to whoever can help 
them flee.293  
Further, political leaders and other personalities even questioned the imposition of 
martial law. A debate on the imposition of martial law at the Philippine Senate shows the 
extent of the political clout of these clans in the country.294 Julkipli Wadi, a professor of 
Islamic studies at the University of the Philippines, implied that the implementation of 
martial law for the whole of Mindanao was too big a reaction of the government for a small 
issue of serving a warrant of arrest to Hapilon.295 He claimed that the terrorists can be 
neutralized militarily through surgical operations which need not involve the whole 
apparatus of military forces in the whole island in the south.  
Indeed, the Marawi Siege was a result of the deep influence of patron-client 
relations that exists in the Philippines, particularly in Mindanao, but these same patron-
client relations did not prevent the destruction of the unified threat groups with the 
leadership of the present administration. While there are attempts to use the negotiation 
card as patrons do when their clients are on the disadvantage, this time it did not work out. 
C. CONCLUSION
The failure to prevent the three major terrorist incidents follows a trend that exists
in the IC. The two elements of the theory of preventive action help explain how and why 
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they happened. On the other hand, the theory of patron-client relations explained the 
powerful dyadic relationships that can both hinder and help the intel community from 
collecting information, that disrupt formal chains of command, and that can make threat 
groups harder to penetrate. 
The inability to gather enough precise tactical intelligence is affected by the internal 
deficiencies inside the organization such as limited resources and the culture of competition 
exacerbated by the rationalist view of personnel. In the Zamboanga Siege, the warnings 
were imprecise and thus decision makers were not compelled to act. In the Mamasapano 
Massacre, precise tactical intelligence was given, but the decision makers did not act 
because their actions may have had negative implications on the ongoing peace 
negotiations. In the Marawi Siege, even though the precise tactical intelligence was not 
enough, and decision makers decided to act, it did not prevent the grand-scale terrorist 
activity mounted by DI.  
Patron-client relations affected the performance of the IC to gather intelligence 
necessary to validate the threat that terrorist groups in Mindanao posed. In the Zamboanga 
Siege, the IC was prevented by the amorphous, latent, and elusive character of Misuari and 
RME-MG relations aside from what exist inside the IC organization affecting their 
mandated mission. In the Mamasapano Massacre, patron-client relations between President 
Aquino, suspended PNP Chief Purisima, and others in their sphere of influence played a 
vital role in the planning, preparation, and execution of OPLAN Exodus aside from the fact 
that the IC’s mission was hampered by the patron-client relations that exist in tight knit 
clan based communities in Mamasapano, Maguindanao, although this could have been 
beneficial to the IC if it was exploited properly.  
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter presents the implications of the three cases for the Philippine’s 
intelligence operations, overall findings, and recommendations. It identifies the IC’s 
challenges as a lack of resources, competition within the IC, patron-client relations within 
the IC, patron-client relations within the threat groups and their communities, and failure 
to deliver on peace negotiations. All of these factors impacted the IC’s ability to deliver 
precise information that decision makers could appreciate and act upon. The 
recommendations consider how to improve not only the IC challenges but also how to 
collaborate with important decision makers who can influence the fight against terrorism. 
The chapter ends with recommendations for future studies. 
A. CONCLUSION 
The Philippines as a state is still in the process of consolidation. There are still 
pockets of resistance among its people to the legitimate use of violence. The armed forces, 
as the only legitimate user of violence and protector of the people and the state, cannot 
properly perform its mandate without the support of the IC. Intelligence organizations are 
tasked with gathering and analyzing information to support the mission of the PSF to create 
an environment conducive to sustainable development, democracy, and a just and lasting 
peace.296 On this note, the challenges posed to the IC on a wider scale directly challenge 
the credibility and legitimacy of the state’s ability to govern. The IC’s role is in the heart 
of all the operations in the fight against terrorism. 
The AFP intelligence community is in crisis. The three cases studied here reflect 
the challenges the IC faced with insufficient resources to carry out the mission of giving 
policy and decision makers the decision advantage. The Zamboanga Siege case, for 
example, demonstrates the inability of the IC to provide a sufficient intelligence product 
for decision and policy makers to act upon. It reveals the weakness of the IC to effectively 
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react to circumstances that need an immediate response. For the period in review, it 
suggests that not enough interventions exist to make the IC more responsive and effective.  
All three cases illustrate a lack of resources within the IC. External support 
sometimes helps offset some of these deficiencies, such as U.S. support facilitating 
OPLAN Exodus at the start of the Mamasapano Massacre. Each case demonstrates that 
staffing and technology are insufficient to cover the variety and complexity of threats in 
the Philippines. The all-source analytic capability (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, and 
OSINT) required for a responsive intelligence apparatus is lacking and is exacerbated by 
the IC’s competitive, secretive, and patron-client culture.  
The Mamasapano Massacre and the Marawi Siege demonstrate unrecognized 
competition among the PSF, which hinders collaboration and diffusion and fusion of 
intelligence. The events before the Mamasapano Massacre made it unclear whether the 
PNP-SAF or the AFP special operations units were leading the fight against terrorism. The 
PNP-SAF, as the primary unit mandated to conduct counterterrorism interdictions within 
the country, overlaps with other special units of the AFP with almost the same 
counterterrorism capabilities. They all work toward the same goal but, at times, fail to fuse 
their efforts. The IC’s competitive culture, upon which the organizations are embedded, is 
so powerful that rational choice by personnel often outweighs the need for diffusion and 
fusion of information in accomplishing the IC’s mission. Their cost-benefit calculations 
contribute more to competition than to creating an environment of cooperation.  
It can be surmised that the IC as an institution is affected by patron-client relations. 
Commanders who often have the power and influence often fill in intelligence officers and 
operatives based on their loyalty and not on their intelligence capabilities for the mission. 
Trust and confidence stemming from these dyadic relationships carry more weigh than the 
imperative to accomplishment the mission effectively.  
The patron-client relations within the tight nature of society and culture of the 
Moro-Muslim community in Mindanao further prevents the IC from more effectively 
performing its mission of gathering and sharing information. Recruiting a viable HUMINT 
asset who has excellent placement and access to the terrorist organizations becomes 
increasingly difficult. Patron-client relations also help explain the links that presently exist 
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among multiple threat groups (MILF, BIFF, and PAGs), which were uncovered during the 
Marawi Siege.  
The fragile and contentious peace agreements between the government and the 
Moro-Muslim secessionist movements contributed to uncertainties in the security 
environment in Mindanao. Peace negotiations with some groups—giving attention to 
MILF but not MNLF as in the Zamboanga Siege case—provided the government a false 
sense of security because it did not keep a broader view of how these groups interact. The 
peace negotiation dimension of the GPH-MILF relationship prior to the Mamasapano 
Massacre provided a gap in the ability of intelligence units to obtain sufficient coverage in 
these controlled areas.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The role of the IC must be emphasized in providing precise tactical intelligence for 
decision makers, who have a strong influence on the fight against terrorism, to decide and 
act. For the IC to succeed as prescribed by the theory of preventive action, its focus must 
be on gathering precise tactical intelligence while fostering constructive relationships with 
stakeholders’ policy and decision makers. If done, when the time comes for the IC to 
deliver its products, these policy and decision makers will be more willing to listen and 
decide to act on the intelligence provided.297 
The following recommendations target the most appropriate courses of action that 
can be done to maximize decision makers’ involvement in addressing the threat of 
terrorism. Both the theory of preventative action and the theory of patron-client relations 
highlight decision makers’ importance in counterterrorism. With this in mind, I endeavor 
to use the stakeholder (decision makers) matrix, presented in Table 1, which was developed 
during a counterterrorism workshop for the different intelligence officers at the Special 
Intelligence School Intelligence Service Armed Forces of the Philippines (SITS-
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ISAFP).298 Among others, the following stakeholders were identified as the most likely 
entities to have both the importance and influence on the fight against terrorism:  
• Philippine security forces 
• Media  
• National government 
• Elite families (political clans) 
• International and local terrorist organizations 
• Local government units (LGUs) 
• Local populace/community 
• Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
• Muslim religious organizations 
• Nonsectarian groups 
• Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).299 
 The matrix in Table 1 categorizes these stakeholders according to the degree of 
importance and influence (high or low) each has on the fight against terrorism as prescribed 
by the two theories used in the analysis. Importance refers to the roles decision makers play 
in counterterrorism efforts, while influence refers to the authority and impact they have 
over the way the population thinks and acts. The table also depicts what action needs to 
take place for each type of stakeholder: engage, capacitate, satisfy and monitor. This 
analysis will facilitate a holistic approach that can be crafted by the whole-of-government 
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Table 1. Stakeholder (Decision Maker) Matrix300 
 
Key stakeholders have decision makers in their hierarchy who resemble patron-
client relationships and who could act in accordance with their interests, both individually 
and for their patrons or clients. Thus, the decision makers from the different stakeholders 
should have the precise data or intelligence products for them to act and make informed 
judgements. In this way, intelligence can play a significant role in supporting the 
comprehensive approach derived from the confluence of factors that affect the country 
under the threat of terrorism. Therefore, the role of the PSF intelligence community in the 
fight against terrorism should be to assist all instrumentalities of the government to have 
the decision advantage so that they can work in unison in confronting the menace and 
partner with community-based groups.  
 
 
300 Adapted from Counterterrorism Workshop, SITS-ISAFP. 





























A. High Importance, Low Influence 
 









B. High Importance, High Influence 
 
• Philippine security forces 
• Media 
• National government 
• Local//international terrorist groups 
 




C. Low Importance, Low Influence 
 
• Nongovernmental organizations 
• Nonsectarian groups 





D. Low Importance, High Influence 
 
• Muslim religious groups 
• Elite families (clans) 
 
Require monitoring to help ensure they are 
satisfied, or swing them to our side. Ensure 
they do not become negatively interested. 
 
Action: MONITOR 
INFLUENCE LOW HIGH 
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1. High Importance, Low Influence Stakeholders 
The Philippines needs to capacitate the local government units and the local 
communities to weaken the patron-client relations inimical to the government and grow 
the IC’s network for potential HUMINT resources. What happened in Zamboanga, 
Mamasapano, and Marawi suggest that the local government and populace lack the 
capacity to work against the threat groups’ strong patron-client ties. They rarely have the 
courage to report any unusual situations in their community. Further, the local community 
will be a good source of action agents (HUMINT) that the IC seeks so that an intelligence 
project can be launched to neutralize the leaders and members of terrorist groups. The local 
populace can and should play a significant role in protecting their communities from the 
exploits of terrorists, other violent groups, and powerful patrons and their clients.  
2. High Importance, High Influence Stakeholders 
The Philippine security forces must be engaged, particularly the IC, to synchronize 
its efforts according to established mechanisms that promote fusion of intelligence, 
cooperation, and unity of effort. The mechanisms need the constant buildup of trust and 
confidence so that the relationship between the IC and decision makers is enhanced. To 
encourage collaboration, the U.S. capture reward system (and any other offered) should be 
given in the form of aid to the community of the informants so that no specific unit of the 
IC benefits from the fund. The conduct of intelligence collection by the IC toward different 
threat groups must be focused on neutralizing the leadership, particularly the HVTs, 
stopping their resources and their resource-generation capabilities, countering their 
narratives in the information environment, denying their recruitment in madrasahs, and 
preventing the mainstream MNLF and MILF be recruited to their ranks.301 
Further, the PSF must be engaged so that it can be empowered to conduct more 
coordination activities with global counterparts in the areas of intelligence gathering, 
capability building, and enhancement. The support of the United States as a longtime ally 
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of the Philippines from the different cases studied was enormous and cannot be discounted. 
The intelligence products, particularly the real-time awareness that the United States 
provided in terms of its manned/unmanned platforms were very helpful to decision makers. 
It is high time that the armed forces be given effective tools such as IMINT platforms on 
which to combat the global threat of terrorism. The use of manned/unmanned IMINT-
capable aircraft was proven to give precise tactical intelligence in the three cases studied.  
The national government must also be engaged to develop a long-term plan that 
addresses the basic needs of the people and provides them with a sense of hope, meaning, 
and purpose, freeing them from the despair that leads to radicalization, then extremism. 
The government should take a holistic view of the drivers of conflict, being careful not to 
lose sight of those that predate the emergence of jihadist cells, notably the demands of 
many Muslims in Mindanao for a greater say in running their own affairs and reaping the 
benefits of the region’s natural resources. The national government could draw lessons 
from the Mamasapano Massacre wherein the MILF engaged the government in peace 
negotiations but at the same time provided HVTs a sanctuary in their camps. This should 
not be tolerated given the sincerity of the government to end the decades-long conflict in 
Mindanao. The national government should send a strong message to the different 
threat groups, as it did  in Zamboanga City and Marawi City during and after the sieges, 
that the government was willing to use all its efforts and the full extent of the law to attain 
their total elimination if not minimize their impact to the communities if they carry out 
terrorist acts.  
The local and international terrorist groups must be engaged by the full might of 
the PSF by destroying or co-opting their leadership, denying them safe havens, and 
reforming the environment that encourages their creation. The interrelations of 
MNLF/MILF personalities with their presence in MILF- and MNLF-controlled territories 
were a recognized but unresolved gray area in the peace agreements. Sometimes highly 
skilled HVTs with bombmaking capabilities are used as leverage in the peace negotiations. 
Thus, destroying their leadership structure, particularly the elimination of HVTs, must be 
the focus of joint (Army, Navy, Air Force and PNP) intelligence operations. The 
neutralization of these HVTs would deny the fighters direction, contributing to their 
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demise. Further, denying the threat groups safe havens could prevent them from further 
developing their capabilities. This could be done by engaging the MNLF and MILF 
leadership to strictly implement the tenets of the peace agreement, especially since the three 
cases studied revealed collaboration among their leaders and followers. Lastly, reforming 
the environment which gives rise to extremism must be in the government’s overall effort 
to break off the sources of terrorist fighters. This could be done by empowering individuals 
and communities that promote peace and support a political solution to the Mindanao 
conflict.  
3. Low Importance, High Influence Stakeholders 
The elite families (clans in Mindanao) and Muslim religious groups must be 
monitored and the government must ensure that the decision makers within these groups 
are satisfied with programs employed in the government’s fight against terrorism. These 
clan and Muslim religious leaders are viable HUMINT resources for collaboration because 
of their close contact with local populace. They should be empowered to lead in identifying 
the possible radical ideologues within their ranks and rewarded for doing so. As much as 
possible, the IC must identify the core interests and goals of these groups and support the 
government’s effort to swing these groups to side of the government by identifying 
moderate members who can be champions of peaceful Islam and prevent radicalization of 
Muslim communities.302  
4. Low Importance, Low Influence Stakeholders 
A better understanding is needed of the low importance, low influence stakeholders, 
which are dominated by private-sector groups. The Philippines needs to harness the 
enormous potential of the NGOs, nonsectarian groups, IOC, and other related stakeholders. 
The private sector has its own vested interest in collaborating against violent elements to 
secure its future and existing investments and economic opportunities; thus, we need to 
determine the best ways to deploy their economic might, networks, and agility to respond 
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to situations against the threat of terrorism. A good example was when my intelligence unit 
was looking for a connection with the HVTs and fortunately a BIN coming from the private 
sector provided a viable action agent. It can be noted that these private sectors are in one 
way or another patrons to their clients in several of the communities in Mindanao. They 
maintain an incomparable influence over their clients, which their clients often look at with 
both a debt of gratitude. 
C. FUTURE STUDIES 
This thesis identified some key problems the Philippines and its IC faces when 
countering terrorism. Future studies could expand on how to best achieve the 
recommendations above by improving resources, technological capabilities, IC personnel 
and assignments, and diffusion and fusion of intelligence. Future studies could also 
investigate the best ways to engage the Philippine’s mainstream media. The mainstream 
media could play a vital role in countering the ideological battle between violence and 
peace. If we could convince the media that the very first victory of any terroristic act is the 
publicity value, perhaps we could engage the media to deprive the threat of terrorism of 
this vital victory. While acknowledging that the principal obligation of the media is to 
inform the populace, a middle ground could perhaps be reached in terms of providing the 
information regarding brutal acts without necessarily sensationalizing or romanticizing 
their actions. Finally, knowledge about and theories related to patron-client relations may 
need updating, especially in light of changes in the past 20 years in the global economy, 
social media, and the terrorist groups themselves.  
Governments all over the world seek solutions to the terrorism threat. Powerful 
nations like the United States, China, and Russia often try to crush it primarily through use 
of force, while other countries tend to rely a combination of legal actions and force. The 
Philippines tried to combine both approaches by enacting into law the Human Security Act 
of 2007 and attacking the terrorists head-on, as it did in the Zamboanga Siege, 
Mamasapano Massacre, and Marawi Siege, and in other parts of Mindanao. Unfortunately, 
these methods by themselves have been ineffective. Because of the nature and complexity 
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of security forces and threats in the Southern Philippines, a holistic approach to address the 
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